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I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts have long recognized that a criminal defendant should not appear
in restraints before the jury unless the judge has made an individualized
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determination that such restraints are necessary for security reasons.
Similarly, in civil cases, due process demands an individualized
determination of the need to restrain a litigant or witness during a jury trial.'
While the rule governing the use of restraints in jury trials is clear, the
Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of indiscriminate
restraints in proceedings before a judge, resulting in conflicting decisions
by state and federal courts about this issue.2 Removal proceedings, which
take place before an immigration judge, provide an opportunity to clarify
procedural due process rights regarding the use of restraints in proceedings
that do not involve a jury. Such clarification would benefit not only
immigration detainees but also criminal defendants and civil litigants who
have bench trials, pretrial hearings, or sentencing hearings before a judge.
Immigration courts are part of the Executive Office of Immigration
Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice. A 1988 memorandum of
understanding (MOU) between the EOIR and the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service, which is now Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), sets forth guidelines on immigration court security that
are still utilized today.3 The MOU provides that ICE bears the primary
responsibility of providing adequate security in courtrooms located within
immigration detention facilities.4 If an immigration judge feels that the
security measures are inadequate to ensure the safety of the people in the
courtroom, the judge may request ICE to upgrade the security level.' The
judge may also adjourn a hearing if ICE fails to comply with a request for
increased security.6 However, if the judge requests a downgrade in security,
such as having restraints removed, ICE need not comply, and the judge

1

See, e.g., Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926, 927 (7th Cir. 2014) (Section 1983 lawsuit brought
by an inmate against correctional officers for excessive force); Davidson v. Riley, 44 F.3d 1118,
1122-23 (2d Cir. 1995) (Section 1983 lawsuit brought by an inmate against correctional officers
for interference with right of access to courts); Holloway v. Alexander, 957 F.2d 529, 530 (8th
Cir. 1992) (Section 1983 lawsuit brought by an inmate regarding living conditions and punitive
isolation area in maximum security prison); Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244, 246-47 (7th Cir. 1993)
(addressing the shackling of witnesses who were inmates).
2
3
4

See infra Parts III, IV.
id.
id.

5 6id.
Id.
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must commence the hearing.7 Thus, ICE maintains the authority to make
the final decision about the use of restraints in immigration court.'
Although ICE's shackling practices vary across the country, in at least
some jurisdictions ICE has exercised its authority under the 1988
Memorandum to indiscriminately shackle all detainees. The exact extent of
this practice is unknown, but recent litigation suggests that it is not
uncommon.9 In fact, such litigation indicates that ICE has indiscriminately
shackled detainees even in courtrooms located outside of detention
facilities, such as the San Francisco Immigration Court.' 0 Consequently,
detained noncitizens frequently appear in immigration court looking like
criminals, wearing orange jumpsuits, handcuffs, leg irons, and belly chains,
even though there has been no individualized determination that they pose a
safety threat or flight risk.
This Article argues that procedural due process requires an
individualized judicial determination of the need for restraints in removal
proceedings based on the same rationales underlying this prohibition in the
criminal context. Specifically, the indiscriminate use of restraints in
removal proceedings diminishes the dignity of the proceedings, impairs a
litigant's ability to participate fully in his or her defense, and undermines
the fairness of the fact-finding process. Individualized judicial
determinations about the need for restraints would minimize these
infringements on important rights while still protecting the government's
security interests. Such determinations would also avoid the high risk of
erroneous deprivation that results when an adversarial party is allowed to
make self-serving decisions about the use of restraints in the courtroom.
Part II provides background information on the detention and
deportation of noncitizens, describing the rapid expansion of immigration
detention, the numerous challenges that detainees face in removal
proceedings, and how poorly they fare in terms of outcomes compared to
non-detained individuals. Against this backdrop of the quasi-criminal
removal process, Part III explains the historical origins and contemporary
rationale for the prohibition against the indiscriminate use of restraints in

8 Id.
9Recent litigation shows, for example, that ICE is engaged in indiscriminate shackling in
California and Massachusetts. See Cindy Chang, Shackling to End at San FranciscoImmigration
Court, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2014/jan/23/local/la-me-Inshackling-immigration-20140123; Reid v. Donelan, 2 F. Supp. 3d 38, 46-47, (D. Mass. 2014).
10Chang, supra note 9.
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criminal jury trials and explores how some courts have extended this
prohibition to criminal proceedings before a judge.
In Part IV, the Article discusses how courts have embraced a similar
standard in the civil context, requiring individualized determinations by the
trial judge and prohibiting the delegation of this duty to a correctional
officer that is an adversarial party. Part IV then provides a detailed analysis
of whether procedural due process requires an individualized judicial
determination of the need for restraints in removal proceedings under the
three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge, which requires courts to consider the
private interests at stake, the government interest, and the risk of erroneous
deprivation with and without the additional procedures.".
Part V deepens this procedural due process analysis by examining
empirical studies suggesting that restraints may have profound cognitive
and behavioral effects on both the restrained individual and the judge.
These studies are relevant to understanding the private interests at stake
under the first factor of the Mathews test, as well as the risk of erroneous
deprivation under the third factor. In addition, these studies support an
argument that prejudice should be presumed for due process violations
involving the use of restraints because the psychological and behavioral
impacts are so difficult to measure. The Article offers recommendations in
Part VI and concludes in Part VII.
II.

BACKGROUND ON DETENTION AND DEPORTATION OF
NONCITIZENS

During the past twenty years, the number of individuals in civil
immigration detention has expanded dramatically, from a daily population
of about 6,000 in 1994 to around 33,000 today. 12 Annually, over 400,000
people pass through immigration detention, including individuals with
serious health problems, mentally incompetent individuals, and the
"424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
12CIVIC,

detention/

(last

DETENTION

visited

MAP

Dec.

2,

&

STATISTICS,

http://endisolation.org/about/imnmigration-

2014);

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS (ERO) STATISTICAL TRACKING UNIT: FOIA 13-

17502 FY 2013 YTD AVERAGE DAILY POPULATION (ADP) BY DETENTION FACILITY (reporting
an average daily population of 33,811 in FY2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dfs/detainee
popytd20l3.pdf; IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ERO CUSTODY MANAGEMENT

DIVISION, FOIA 14-03470: AUTHORIZED FACILITIES WITH FYO3-14 ADP (showing average daily
center for FYO3-FY14 by detention center), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dfs/detaineepopfy03fyl4.pdf.
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elderly.13 These detainees are held in approximately 250 facilities across the
United States, at a cost of over $5 million per day. 14 Some of these facilities
are ICE Service Processing Centers or Contract Detention Facilities run by
for-profit companies, but the vast majority are local and state jails that have
Intergovernmental Service Agreements with ICE.15 It recently came to light
that a congressional directive known as the "bed mandate," which has
existed for several years, requires ICE to detain an average of 34,000 people
per day.' 6

The rapid expansion of immigration detention means that an increasing
number of noncitizens must go through removal proceedings while in
custody. Many of them never have the opportunity to request a bond
hearing in immigration court because they are subject to mandatory
detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).1 7 While the
Ninth Circuit held in 2013 that mandatory detainees are entitled to a bond
hearing after six months of detention, other circuits do not limit the length
of detention before a removal order becomes final. 18 Even if a noncitizen is
lucky enough to receive a bond hearing, the judge may refuse to set a bond.
One study of noncitizens apprehended by ICE in New York found that 80%
were detained without bond, compared to just 1% of criminal defendants

"IMMIGRATION

AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FACT SHEET: ERO-DETAINEE HEALTH

CARE-FY201 1, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/dhc-fyl 1.pdf.
14National Immigration Forum, Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for
Immigration DetentionDo Not Add Up to Sensible Policies (2013), http://www.detentionwatch
network.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/
files/10.21.2011_MathoflmmigrationDetention.pdf.
1s DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FY2013: BUDGET IN BRIEF, http://www.dhs.gov

/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf.
16 Nick Miroff, ControversialQuota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, THE WASH. POST
(Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigrationdetention-boom/2012/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-adla-la919f2ed890 story.html. The FY2013

budget, however, allocated $1.959 billion to ICE's custody operations to support 32,800 detention
beds, a slight decrease from 34,000 beds in FY2012. See DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
supra note 15.

"See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012). In addition, "arriving aliens," those who showed up at a
point of entry and asked for admission to the U.S., including asylum-seekers, are not entitled to a
bond hearing in court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2012).
"Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding a preliminary
injunction that required arriving aliens and mandatory detainees to receive a bond hearing after six
months in detention). The Supreme Court has held that detention beyond 180 days after a final
order of removal is unconstitutional. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320-21 (2001).
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who are held without bail.' 9 Finally, many noncitizens remain detained
simply because they cannot afford to post the bond set by the judge.
Detained noncitizens face multiple challenges in fighting their cases.
One of the biggest challenges is finding an attorney, since there is no right
to appointed counsel in removal proceedings. 2 0 Attorneys are often reluctant
to represent them because communication is difficult, detention centers tend
to be located in remote places, and the detained docket usually moves very
quickly, allowing little time for preparation. Many detainees also cannot
afford an attorney, since they generally lose their source of income after
being taken into custody. In fiscal year 2013, 41% of all individuals in
removal proceedings, detained and non-detained, were unrepresented. 2 1 The
percent of unrepresented detainees is often much higher, depending on
location. In Texas, for example, 83-90% of immigration detainees are
unrepresented.22
Unrepresented detainees must fend for themselves in immigration court,
where they face a trial attorney employed by ICE who acts like a prosecutor
in seeking to deport them. They must try to navigate complex immigration
laws alone, often in a language that is not their own. If they manage to
figure out that they are eligible for some type of relief from removal, they
must then attempt to gather supporting documents while detained. Such
documents may include marriage certificates, birth certificates, death
certificates, declarations, human rights reports, and other evidence. And
they must often do all of this without the support of family or friends, since
immigration detainees are frequently sent far from their homes to detention
centers in other parts of the country. One study initiated by the Honorable
Robert Katzmann, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
19

NYU School of Law Immigrant Rights Clinic, Immigrant Defense Project, Families for
Freedom, Insecure Communities, DevastatedFamilies:New Data on Immigration Detention and
Deportation in New York
City 9 (2012)
[hereinafter Insecure Communities],
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NYC-FOIA-Report-2012FINAL.pdf.
208 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) ("[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being
represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien's choosing who is
authorized to practice in such proceedings.").
21

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013

STATISTICS YEARBOOK Fl (2014), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyl3syb.pdf.
22Justicefor Immigration'sHidden Population: Protectingthe Rights ofPersons with Mental
Disabilitiesin the Immigration Court and Detention System, TEXAS APPLESEED REP., Mar. 2010,
at 13, availableat http://www.texasappleseed.net/index.php?option-com-docman&task=doc
download&gid=313&Itemid=.

2015]

UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OFRESTRAINTS

221

Circuit, found that ICE transferred 18,000 New Yorkers, over half of those
apprehended from October 2005 through December 2010, to faraway
jurisdictions like Texas and Louisiana.2 3 Almost all of those transferred
outside of New York and New Jersey were ordered deported.24
Compounding these challenges, detainees are forced to appear in court
looking like violent criminals, wearing orange jumpsuits and restraints.
During both master calendar hearings, which resemble arraignments or
pretrial hearings, and merits hearings, which resemble trials, detainees are
normally brought into court by ICE wearing handcuffs, waist chains, and
leg irons, which ICE calls "full restraints."25 The detainees generally remain
in these restraints throughout the proceedings. ICE also frequently chains
detainees to each other during master calendar hearings in what is
euphemistically called a "daisy chain." 26 The restraints are not only visible
to everyone in the courtroom, but they are also audible, making clanking
noises whenever the detainee moves. Detainees report that the restraints
cause pain and physical discomfort, as well as humiliation and fear,
especially as they are often kept in restraints for most of the day.27
For an eight a.m. court hearing, detainees are usually awoken well
before sunrise, even if the court is near the detention center. Before being
packed into transportation vans, they are placed in full restraints, and they
remain that way for hours while waiting in ICE holding cells, which are
usually located close to the courthouse. The holding cells are often freezing
cold, cramped and filthy.28 Detainees report that the restraints prevent them
from being able to eat, drink, or use the toilet by themselves, causing both
physical and emotional distress. 29 Thus, by the time they appear in court,
they have already had a harrowing experience. After sitting restrained in
court for what may be hours more, they are finally called up for their
hearings. Detainees then take their seat before the judge in chains.

23

See Insecure Communities, supranote 19, at 3.
Id. (reporting that 94.5% of those transferred outside the area were deported).
25
See Abadia-Peixoto v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 277 F.R.D. 572, 574 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations, Use of
Restraints, Policy Number ERO 11155.1 14, November 19, 2012 (on file with author).
26
See Abadia-Peixoto, 277 F.R.D. at 574.
24

27

1d

28

See, e.g., Statement of Anca Plesoianu, submitted to Congressional Ad Hoc Hearing on
Immigration, North Las Vegas, NV, Mar. 17, 2014 (on file with author).
29
See, e.g., id.
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If they are unrepresented, this means that will need to serve the trial
attorney, approach the bench, handle documents, testify, and question
witnesses while wearing handcuffs, leg irons, and a waist chain. If they are
lucky enough to have counsel, they must attempt to communicate with their
attorney while wearing these restraints. Handcuffs and shackles make
passing notes to counsel during the hearing difficult and render talking to
counsel before or after the proceedings almost impossible. After all of the
detainees on the docket have concluded their hearings, ICE transports them
back to the holding cells to endure the same conditions as before, until they
are once again packed into vans or buses and transported to the detention
center. They usually receive only a small amount of food in the holding
cells and do not arrive back at the detention center until late, having spent
the entire day in restraints.3 0
Given the numerous challenges that detainees face, their low rates of
success in immigration court are not surprising. One study found that in
New York City only 18% of the represented detainees and 3% of the
unrepresented ones had favorable outcomes in their removal proceedings.3 1
By comparison, 74% of the represented non-detainees and 13% of the
unrepresented ones had favorable outcomes.32 Other studies confirm that
detainees fare far worse than non-detainees with almost all types of
applications for relief from removal.33 In many cases, these discrepancies
may be due, in part, to higher rates of criminal convictions among the

30

See, e.g., id.
NYIR Study Steering Committee, Accessing Justice: the Availability and Adequacy
of
Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 364 (2011) (Study Report: Part 1).
32
Id at 363.
31

33

See DONALD KERWIN, CHARITABLE LEGAL PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS: WHAT THEY

Do, WHY THEY MATTER, AND How THEY CAN BE EXPANDED, 04-06 Immigr. Briefings 6
(2004). This study found that success rates in non-detained asylum cases were 39% for
represented noncitizens and 14% for unrepresented ones, compared to 18% and 3% respectively
for detainees. In adjustment of status cases, the success rates for non-detainees were 87% for
represented noncitizens and 70% for unrepresented ones, dropping to 41% and 21% percent
respectively for detainees. In cancellation of removal cases for lawful permanent residents, the
success rates for non-detainees were 68% for represented persons and 60% for unrepresented
ones, compared to 59% and 55% respectively for detainees. In cancellation of removal cases for
non-lawful permanent residents, the success rates were 6% for represented persons and 3% for
unrepresented ones; the detainees in the sample lost all such cases, regardless of whether or not
they had counsel. Finally, in INA § 212(c) cases, which involve waivers for certain legal
permanent residents, the success rates for non-detainees were 75% for represented persons and
49% for unrepresented ones, dropping to 56% and 34% respectively for detainees.
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detained population, but the difficulties of fighting a case while detained are
also likely part of the explanation.
The pervasive use of restraints in immigration court might be justified if
there were evidence that detainees pose a serious threat to safety or are
flight risks, but the data indicates that the opposite is true. Statistics
provided by ICE indicate that 40% of detainees have no criminal record and
only about 10-11% have been convicted of a violent crime.34 Thus, there
appears to be a significant rift between the use of restraints in immigration
court and the actual security risk posed by detainees, which raises serious
concerns about whether the current use of restraints in removal proceedings
is constitutional.
1II.

THE USE OF RESTRAINTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Origins ofRule Against RestrainingDefendants During Trial
The rule against restraining defendants during the guilt phase of a
criminal trial has "deep roots in the common law." 3 5 Blackstone explained
that, no matter how serious the indictment, a defendant "must be brought to
the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless there be
evident danger of an escape." 36 A central reason for this prohibition was the
concern that restraints would diminish a defendant's mental faculties.
Courts recognized that a defendant should "stand at ease" 37 during trial in
order to "have the use of his reason, and all advantages to clear his
Removing restraints helped ensure that defendants' "pain
innocence."
shall not take away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to answer, but
at their free will." 3 9
34

See infra notes 189-193.
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005) (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON

35

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 317 (1769)).
36

Id. at 626 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 317

(1769)).
"Id. at 631 (quoting Cranburne's Case, (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 222 (K.B.)).
38
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 154 n.4 (1992) (quoting Trial of Christopher Layer,
(1722) 16 How. St. Tr. 94, 100 (K.B.) ("[T]he authority is that [the defendant] is not to be 'in
vinculis' during his trial, but should be so far free, that he should have the use of his reason, and
all advantages to clear his innocence")).
"Deck, 544 U.S. at 626 (quoting 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 34
(1817) ("If felons come in judgment to answer,... they shall be out of irons, and all manner of
bonds, so that their pain shall not take away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to answer,
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In addition to acknowledging that restraints would impede a defendant's
ability to participate fully in the proceedings, the common law rule
recognized that restraints would skew perceptions of the defendant's
character. A leading eighteenth century treatise on criminal procedure
warned that a defendant "ought not be brought to the Bar in a contumelious
Manner; as with his Hands tied together, or any other Mark of Ignominy
and Reproach, unless there be some Danger of a [Rescue] or Escape." 4 0
Courts also expressed concern that "hav[ing] a man plead for his life" in
shackles before "a court of justice, the highest in the kingdom for criminal
matters, where the king himself is supposed to be personally present,"
undermined the "dignity of the Court."41
State courts in the U.S. followed the common law rule, with published
decisions dating back to the late nineteenth century.42 In 1871, the
California Supreme Court recognized that shackling a defendant "imposes
physical burdens, pains, and restraints upon a prisoner during the progress
of his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his mental faculties,
and thereby [tends] materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his
constitutional rights of defense."4 3 The following year, California codified
this rule in legislation, providing that "[n]o person charged with a public
offense may be subjected, before conviction, to any more restraint than is
necessary for his detention to answer the charge."" Similarly, a U.S.
treatise on criminal procedure from 1895 stated that restraints may be used
only "in extreme and exceptional cases, where the safe custody of the
prisoner and the peace of the tribunal imperatively demand," because a
defendant "at the trial should have the unrestrained use of his reason, and all

but at their free will.")); see also SIR JOHN KELYING, REPORTS OF CROWN CASES 11, (Richard
Loveland Loveland ed., 3d ed. 1873) ("It was resolved that when Prisoners come to the Bar to be
tryed, their Irons ought to be taken off, so that they be not in any Torture while they make their
defense, be their Crime never so great.").
402 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 434 (8th ed. 1894).
41
Layer, 16 How. St. Tr. at 99.
42
Parker v. Territory, 52 P. 361, 363 (Ariz. 1898); State v. Williams, 50 P. 580, 581-82
(Wash. 1897); Rainey v. State, 20 Tex. App. 455, 472-73 (1886); State v. Smith, 8 P. 343 (Or.
1883); Poe v. State, 78 Tenn. 673, 674-78 (1882); State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 592 (1877); People
v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 167 (1871).
43Harrington, 42 Cal. at 168-69; see also People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322, 1322-26 (Cal.
1976).
44
See Criminal Practice Act, § 13 (1872), current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 688 (West
2008) (cited in Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 370 n.9 (Ct. App. 2007)).
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advantages, to clear his innocence."45 The rationales set forth in these cases
continue to justify the prohibition against the indiscriminate use of
restraints in criminal proceedings today.
B. Modern Rationalefor ProhibitionAgainst Indiscriminate
Restraints
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of shackling
defendants during trial for the first time in 1970, a century after the first
published state court decisions on this issue. In Illinois v. Allen, the
Supreme Court indicated that the prohibition against physically restraining
a defendant at trial is integral to the right to due process under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.46 That case involved an unusually obstreperous
defendant, who, among other things, threatened that the judge would be a
"corpse" by lunchtime and tore up his attorney's file.47 Recognizing the
importance of order and decorum in the courtroom, the Court proposed
three ways for trial judges to handle such "disruptive, contumacious,
stubbornly defiant defendants."4 8 One option was to "bind and gag" the
defendant, but the Court expressed grave concerns about this proposal,
stating that "even to contemplate such a technique, much less see it, arouses
a feeling that no person should be tried while shackled and gagged except
as a last resort."49
The Court offered three reasons why restraints should remain a last
resort. First, "the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect
on the jury's feelings about the defendant."5 0 Second, "the use of this
technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum
of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold."', Third, the
defendant's ability to communicate with counsel "is greatly reduced when
the defendant is in a condition of total physical restraint."5 2 In light of these
disadvantages, the Court found that a trial judge is allowed to decide to

45

1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 955,

at 572-73 (4th ed. 1895) (internal quotations

omitted).
U.S. 337 (1970); see also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628 (2005).
397 U.S. at 340.
Id. at 343-44.

46397

47
Allen,
48
49

Id. at 344.

sold
51

id

52

1d
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have a defendant removed from the courtroom. However, the Court did
not rule out that "in some situations .. . binding and gagging might possibly
be the fairest and most reasonable way" to handle a highly disruptive
defendant.54
In 1976, the Court examined a related issue about whether it was
inherently unfair to require a defendant to stand trial in prison garb. 5
Estelle v. Williams explained that judges must "carefully guard against
dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence
and beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 6 The Court was concerned that "the
constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive,
identifiable attire may affect a juror's judgment."57 The Court was also
troubled that only those who could not post bail would be compelled to
stand trial in jail garb, imposing a condition on one category of defendants
in a manner "repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment."
A decade later, in Holbrook v. Flynn, the Supreme Court considered
whether the presence of four uniformed state troopers in the first row of the
spectator section of the courtroom during a trial violated due process.59 The
Court found that the conspicuous presence of security personnel during trial
was not inherently prejudicial and did not need to be justified by an
essential state interest specific to each trial.6 0 The Court distinguished the
use of identifiable security officers from the inherently prejudicial practice
of shackling on the basis that there is a "wider range of inferences that a
juror might reasonable draw from the officers' presence." 6 1 The Court
explained that "[w]hile shackling and prison clothes are unmistakable
indications of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large,
the presence of guards at a defendant's trial need not be interpreted as a sign
that he is particularly dangerous or culpable"; jurors might simply perceive
the officers "as elements of an impressive drama." 6 2
5

31d.

54 id
55

See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 502 (1976).
Id. at 503 (citation omitted).
s 7Id. at 504-05.
56

5

Id at 505-06.
s"See 475 U.S. 560, 562 (1986).
6See id. at 568-69.

"Id. at 569.
62
d
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Most recently, in its 2005 decision in Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme
Court addressed in detail the constitutionality of shackling during the guilt
and penalty phases of a trial.63 A jury had sentenced Carman Deck to death
for robbing and murdering an elderly couple in their home.M During the
sentencing proceeding, Deck was shackled with leg irons, handcuffs, and a
belly chain. The Court explained that a consensus had emerged among
state courts and commentators that Allen, Flynn, and Williams established a
constitutional basis for the prohibition against shackling a defendant during
trial which could be "overcome in a particular instance by essential state
interests such as physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom
decorum." 66 Deck made it clear that "the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court
determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a
state interest specific to a particular trial."
According to Deck, older cases addressing restraints had emphasized the
need to prevent physical suffering, while more modem cases stressed the
importance of giving effect to three fundamental legal principles: the
presumption of innocence, the right to counsel, and a dignified judicial
process.68 The Court painted the first two principles with broad strokes,
rather than depicting them as specific, technical rights in a criminal
proceeding. For example, in discussing how visible restraints undermine the
presumption of innocence, the Court noted that they also impede "the
related fairness of the fact-finding process." 6 9 In discussing the right to
counsel, the Court included "a defendant's ability to participate in his own
defense" and quoted Harrington'slanguage about how restraints confuse a
defendant's mental faculties. 70
The Court then found that the reasons for prohibiting shackling during
the guilt phase apply with comparable force to the penalty phase of a capital
case. 7 Although the presumption of innocence is no longer relevant, the
jury must decide between life and death, which the Court described as "no
6

See 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005).
id. at 624-25.

6See

6Id at 625.
66
1d at 628.
6

1See

id. at 629.

61Id at 630.
69 id
70

d at 631.

n See id. at 630-32.
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less important than the decision about guilt" due to the "severity and
finality of the sanction."72 In addition, the Court stressed the need for
accuracy, noting that the appearance of the offender in shackles "almost
inevitably implies to a jury, as a matter of common sense, that court
authorities consider the offender a danger to the community." 7 3 The use of
shackles also "almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of
the character of the defendant," which "undermines the jury's ability to
weight accurately all relevant considerations."74 The Court therefore
concluded that judges must exercise discretion in making an individualized
determination of whether shackling is necessary during the penalty phase of
a capital proceeding, taking into account special circumstances related to
the particular defendant on trial.75
These Supreme Court precedents leave at least two important questions
unanswered: whether the prohibition against indiscriminate shackling
applies to bench trials and whether it applies to other types of proceedings
before a judge. As discussed below, courts are divided on these issues.76
C. Application ofProhibitionto ProceedingsBefore a Judge
The highest courts of at least three states have applied the prohibition
against indiscriminate restraints to proceedings before a judge. The
decisions of the Supreme Courts of Illinois and California emphasize how
restraints impede a defendant's ability to exercise his or her constitutional
rights and undermine dignity, while the highest court of New York
recognizes that the sight of restraints may also have an unconscious
prejudicial effect on the judge.
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that judges must make an
individualized determination of the need for restraints in juvenile
adjudications, analogizing them to criminal trials and reasoning that it
makes no difference whether the case is before a judge or jury. In 2006,
the court reached the same conclusion in a criminal case, holding that,

72Id at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Id at 632-33.
74

Id at 633.

7Id.
76

See infra Part III.C.
7See People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 353 (Ill. 2006); People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302,
1321-22 (Cal. 1991); People v. Best, 979 N.E.2d 1187 (N.Y. 2012).
"See In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 73 (Ill. 1977).
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"even when there is no jury, any unnecessary restraint is impermissible
because it hinders the defendant's ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of
the presumption of innocence, and demeans both the defendant and the
proceedings."79 Applying this logic, the court found that a concealed
electronic stun belt requires the same due process analysis as any visible
restraint.o In deeming visibility unimportant, the court emphasized the
impact of restraints on the defendant, rather than on the fact-finder. 8 The
court also confirmed that the judge, not law enforcement, is responsible for
determining how security regarding the defendant should be handled "so as
to fully protect his constitutional rights." 82
Similarly, in 2012, the Court of Appeals of New York, the highest court
in that state, held that "the rule governing visible restraints in jury trials
applies with equal force to nonjury trials."8 The court found "no basis" for
distinguishing bench trials from jury trials, stating that the three reasons
given by the Supreme Court in Deck are equally implicated when the factfinder is a judge.84 While stating that a judge is "uniquely capable of . .
making an objective determination based upon appropriate legal criteria,"
the court also recognized that "judges are human, and the sight of a
defendant in restraints may unconsciously influence even a judicial factfinder."" In addition, the court reasoned that "the psychological impact on
the defendant of being continually restrained at the order of the individual
who will ultimately determine his or her guilt should not be overlooked." 86
Finally, the court considered "the way the image of a handcuffed or
shackled defendant affects the public's perception of that person and of
criminal proceedings generally."87 Applying these principles, the court

"Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 353. In Allen, the court found a due process violation but refused to
find plain error because no trial objection had been made to use of the electronic stun belt. Id. at
360. In other words, the court was not persuaded that the error "resulted in fundamental unfairness
or caused a 'severe threat' to the fairness of the defendant's trial." Id.

sold. at 352.
82

Id. at 358.

83

People v. Best, 979 N.E.2d 1187, 1188 (N.Y. 2012).

8See id. at 1189.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
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found that the trial judge had violated the defendant's constitutional rights
88
by failing to articulate a justification for his restraint.
The California Supreme Court has held that the prohibition against
indiscriminate shackling applies not only at trial, but also at a preliminary
examination before a judge. 89 The court found that the use of shackles in
court has long been prohibited "not just because of the impact they might
have on the jury, but because of their unsettling effect on the defendant and
consequently his constitutional rights of defense."90 The court further
explained that "maintain[ing] the composure and dignity of the individual
accused" and "preserv[ing] respect for the judicial system as a whole" are
"paramount values to be preserved irrespective of whether a jury is present
during the proceeding." 91 In addition, "the unjustified use of restraints
could, in a real sense, impair the ability of the defendant to communicate
or influence witnesses at the preliminary
effectively with counsel ...
92
hearing." The court therefore concluded that there must be some showing
of necessity for the use of shackles at a preliminary hearing, but since the
dangers "are not as substantial as those presented during trial[,] . . . a lesser

showing than that required at trial is appropriate.
These cases
demonstrate that some state courts have recognized the severe impact of
restraints on a defendant as well as their impact on the judge.
The two federal courts that have addressed the constitutionality of
indiscriminate shackling in proceedings before a judge reached different

88d. After finding a due process violation, the court applied the harmless error analysis and
concluded, based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt, that there was no reasonable possibility
that the defendant's appearance in handcuffs contributed to the finding of guilt. Id.
People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302, 1320-22 (1991). The Supreme Court of California
addressed shackling of defendants during proceedings before a jury in detail in a 1976 decision
called People v. Duran. 545 P.2d 1322, 1322-23. Duran discussed how shackling may prejudice
jurors, but also noted "the affront to human dignity, the disrespect for the entire judicial system
which is incident to unjustifiable use of physical restraints, as well as the effect such restraints
have upon a defendant's decision to take the stand." Id. at 1327. In 1981, a California appellate
court extended Duran's reasoning to a preliminary hearing before a judge, explaining that
"[r]espect for the dignity of the individual and the court are values to be preserved whether or not
a jury is present." Solomon v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (Ct. App. 1981). The court
therefore concluded that physical restraints could not be applied at a preliminary examination
without a showing of good cause. Id.
"Fierro, 821 P.2d at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
d. at 1322.
92Id. (footnote omitted).
93 id.
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conclusions than these state courts, but neither of them involved the use of
restraints during a trial. In Zuber, the Second Circuit held that a judge was
not required to make an independent evaluation of the need for restraints
during a sentencing hearing, reasoning that juror bias is "the paramount
concern in such cases" and that it has been "traditionally assumed that
judges, unlike juries, are not prejudiced by impermissible factors."9 4 Thus,
the court permitted the judge to defer to the recommendation of the
Marshals Service on the need to restrain the defendant at the sentencing
hearing.95 Similarly, in Howard, the Ninth Circuit upheld a general policy
of restraining defendants during pretrial hearings, which had been
implemented by the Marshals Service for the Central District of California,
reasoning that "a judge in a pretrial hearing presumably will not be
prejudiced by seeing the defendants in shackles." 96
Judge Cardamone's concurring opinion in Zuber, however, disagreed
with the court's analysis, finding that an independent judicial determination
is necessary because restraints degrade the defendant, interfere with the
dignity of the proceedings, and impair the defendant's ability to assist
counsel-concerns that exist whether the case is before a judge or jury.9 7
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has construed its decision in Howard
narrowly, stressing that the court has not "fully defined the parameters of a
pretrial detainee's liberty interest in being free from shackles at his initial
appearance, or the precise circumstances under which courts may
legitimately infringe upon that interest in order to achieve other aims, such
as courtroom safety." 9 8 Thus, Howard did not establish a rule that shackling
is always permissible if no jury is present. As a district court judge found in
the California litigation challenging the blanket use of shackling in the San
Francisco Immigration Court, "the Howard opinion itself reveals that the
permissibility of a blanket shackling policy turns on a number of factors, of
which the absence of a jury is only one." 99 These factors included the size
of the courtroom, the number of defendants present, and the shortage of

94

United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 103-105 (2d Cir. 1997).

"Id

at 103.
See United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1012-14 (9th Cir. 2007).
97
Id. at 105-06 (Cardamone, J., concurring).
98
United States v. Brandau, 578 F.3d 1064, 1065 (9th Cir. 2009).
96

"Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement at 2, De Abadia-Peixoto v. U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 277 F.R.D. 572, 575-76 (No. 3:11-cv-4001 RS) (citing United States v. Brandau,
578 F.3d 1064, 1065 (9th Cir. 2009)).
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officers to secure the space. It should also be noted that the magistrate judge
at the pretrial hearing in Howard was not the ultimate trier of fact.' 00
There is good reason to think the Ninth Circuit would rule differently in
the context of a trial, where the impact of restraints on a defendant is much
greater. In a case involving a defendant who was tried while wearing a
concealed stun belt, for example, the Ninth Circuit underscored procedural
due process concerns around the use of restraints that were completely
unrelated to prejudicing the jury.10' The court held that the trial judge had
violated due process by failing to make an individualized determination of
the need for the restraints, because the stun belt could interfere with the
defendant's ability to participate fully in his defense, communicate with
counsel, and concentrate on the proceedings.1 02 Thus, the court recognized
several substantial impediments caused by restraints that exist whether the
trial is before a judge or jury.
IV. THE USE OF RESTRAINTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

Although issues around the use of restraints tend to come up most
frequently in criminal cases, restraints may actually pose a much greater
concern in other areas, such as immigration, since over ninety percent of
criminal cases are resolved through plea agreements. 0 3 Criminal defendants
have a well-established due process right not to be subjected to trial in
restraints without an individualized judicial determination of necessity, but
they usually receive no more than the "bare-bones" procedures that govern
guilty pleas.1 04 By contrast, less than ten percent of immigration cases are
"lSeeHoward, 480 F.3d at 1012.
'0 See Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 900-05 (9th Cir. 2003).
02
Id. at 900, 903; see also United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1305-06 (11th Cir.
2002) (finding that a stun belt may impede the right to confer with counsel as well as impair the
"defendant's ability to follow the proceedings and take an active interest in the presentation of his
case"); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1973) (recognizing that restraints
confuse mental faculties and abridge a defendant's constitutional rights); but see Earhart v.
Konteh, 589 F.3d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that requiring a defendant to wear a concealed
stun belt while representing himself at a jury trial, without an individualized determination of
necessity, did not violate due process).
103
See Lindsey Devers, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Research Summary: Plea and Charge
Bargaining3 (2011), available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearch
Summary.pdf; Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (recognizing that the criminal
justice system "is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials").
1"See Anne R. Traum, Using Outcomes to Reframe Guilty Plea Adjudication, 66 FLA. L.
REv. 823, 826, 829-41 (2014) (discussing the largely unregulated nature of plea bargaining and
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resolved informally through prosecutorial discretion, so judicial
adjudication of cases remains the norm.'os Noncitizens facing deportation
are therefore routinely affected by the indiscriminate use of restraints and
are well positioned to challenge this practice.
In addition, since immigration proceedings do not offer the possibility
of a jury trial, they provide fertile ground for formulating standards
regarding the use of restraints in bench trials and pretrial hearings, which
have been underdeveloped in the criminal arena. While scholars have aptly
criticized the asymmetric relationship between the immigration and
criminal systems, whereby the immigration system "absorb[s] the theories,
methods, perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforcement model"
without incorporating its constitutional protections, far less attention has
been paid to the unique opportunities that immigration proceedings provide
to develop the contours of constitutional rights in ways that could benefit
criminal defendants. 0 6

Since immigration proceedings are technically civil, this section first
examines how the rationales behind the prohibition against indiscriminate
restraints have been applied to civil cases and then argues that the 1988
Memorandum governing the use of restraints in removal proceedings
violates procedural due process by failing to require individualized and
independent judicial determinations of the need for restraints.
A. The ProhibitionAgainst IndiscriminateRestraints in Civil Cases
Federal appellate courts have recognized that many of the Supreme
Court's concerns about shackling, articulated in Allen and Deck, apply

how it undercuts constitutional values); ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF
THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 43-44, 166 (2007); William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of
CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 536-37, 557-58 (2001).
105 Syracuse University, ICE Rarely Uses ProsecutorialDiscretion to Close Immigration
Cases, TRAC (Apr. 24, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/whatsnew/email.140424.html (finding that only
6.7% of immigration cases were closed based on prosecutorial discretion between October 2012
and March 2014).
106 See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporationof CriminalJustice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (arguing that
"immigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of the
criminal enforcement model while rejecting the criminal adjudicationmodel in favor of a civil
regulatory regime") (emphasis in original); Jennifer M. Chac6n, UnsecuredBorders: Immigration
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1827, 1873 (2007)
(describing the "asymmetric" relationship between the immigration system and criminal system).
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equally to civil cases, as all persons have the right to a fair trial under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process guarantee. 0 7 The issue of
shackling often comes up in the civil context in involuntary commitment
proceedings or in civil rights actions brought by prisoners. os In these cases,
courts have consistently held that the judge must make an individualized
determination of the need for restraints and cannot delegate this
responsibility to anyone else. 09 Courts balance the interests of the litigant
against the government's need to maintain safety or security in the
courtroom."

Judges

must

"impose

no

greater

restraints than

are

necessary," and they "must take steps to minimize the prejudice resulting
from the presence of the restraints."'" When there are genuine disputes of
material facts regarding the threat to security, the trial court must hold an
evidentiary hearing.'1 2 Thus, in the civil context, as in the criminal one,
"[s]hackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom
must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action."'' 3
Some state courts have extended the prohibition against indiscriminate
shackling to civil proceedings that take place before a judge rather than a
jury. For example, several states require individualized determinations of

1oSee, e.g., Davidson v. Riley, 44 F.3d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he concerns
expressed in Allen are applicable to parties in civil suits as well."); Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d
1274, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that "[a]lthough the criminal cases do not necessarily apply
in a civil proceeding, we find them persuasive" and finding it "no great extension of Supreme
Court precedent to conclude that [being bound in restraints while in the presence of the jury
during an involuntary commitment proceeding] may have violated [Tyars'] rights under the due
process clause"); Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he principles from
Allen . . extend[ ] to include not just criminal defendants, but inmates bringing civil actions and
inmate-witnesses as well."); Holloway v. Alexander, 957 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir. 1992) ("In
[prisoner civil rights] cases, the district court has a responsibility to ensure reasonable efforts are
made to permit the inmate and the inmate's witnesses to appear without shackles during
proceedings before the jury."); Sides v. Cherry, 609 F.3d 576, 581 (3d Cir. 2010) ("Several of our
sister circuit courts have reasoned that the concerns expressed in Allen also apply in the context of
civil trials. . . . We agree with these courts, as 'fairness in a jury trial, whether criminal or civil in
nature, is a vital constitutional right."').
108 See supra note 102 for examples.

1osSee, e.g., Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1122; Tyars, 709 F.2d at 1284-85; Woods, 5 F.3d at 24647; Holloway, 957 F.2d at 530; Sides, 609 F.3d at 581; Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 358
(7th Cir. 1993).
"oSee, e.g., Sides, 609 F.3d at 581.
"1 Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1122-23.
ll 2 See Sides, 609 F.3d at 582; Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1125; Lemons, 985 F.2d at 358.
1 3 Tyars, 709 F.2d at 1284.
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the need for restraints in involuntary commitment proceedings before a
judge.' 14 Furthermore, a growing number of states prohibit indiscriminate
shackling during juvenile adjudications, where there is no right to a jury
trial." 5 So far, twelve states have prohibited indiscriminate shackling of
juveniles through case law,"' legislation,"' or court procedures and
policies."' Recent legislative efforts to address this issue may reflect a
growing awareness of the especially harmful impact of restraints on
children and adolescents." 9 The rationale set forth in some state court
decisions does not, however, depend on any unique characteristics of
juveniles and therefore can be extended to other types of proceedings,
including immigration.
Decisions from Illinois and California provide particularly relevant
reasoning. In a case holding that a 15-year-old should not have been
handcuffed at a juvenile adjudication without a showing of necessity, the
Supreme Court of Illinois stressed that the possibility of prejudicing a jury
is not the only reason underlying the prohibition against indiscriminate
14

See In re T.J.F., 248 P.3d 804, 810 (Mont. 2011) ("we find that in an involuntary
commitment proceeding before a district court sitting without a jury, there must be a showing on
the record that restraints are needed before the District Court may order them."); In re Hoff, 830
N.W.2d 608, 612-13 (N.D. 2013) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed
to independently decide whether to remove a sex offender's restraints during an involuntary
commitment proceeding and instead deferred to the sheriff); In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201,1221-23
(Pa. 2010) (finding that an individualized determination of the need for restraints is required at a
hearing before judge regarding involuntary commitment of a minor to a drug treatment program);
In re Mark P., 932 N.E.2d, 481 485-86 (Ill. 2010) ("At minimum, a respondent appearing before a
judge for trial or hearing should not be shackled without good cause shown on the record.").
15
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548 n.7 (1971).
116
See Tiffany A v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Ct. App. 2007); In re Staley, 364
N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1977); In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 2007); State v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857,
861 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673, 675 (Wash. Ct. Ap. 2002); see also Kim M.
McLaurin, Children in Chains: IndiscriminateShackling ofJuveniles, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
213, 232 n.119 (2012).
7
1 FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.100(b) (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2402.1 (2013); N.Y. Comp. Codes
R. & Regs. tit.9, § 168.3(a) (2011); 237 PA. CODE § 139 (2011). Legislation is pending in Alaska,
Connecticut and South Carolina. See McLaurin, supra note 116, at 232 n. 123.

&

18 See Mary Berkheiser, Unchain the Children, NEV. LAW., June 2012, at 30; Amy Kingsley,
Why the Practice of Shackling Juvenile Defendants is Coming to an End, LAS VEGAS CITY LIFE
(Aug.
8,
2012), http://lasvegascitylife.com/sections/news/why-practice-shackling-juveniledefendants-coming-end.html.; Trial Court of the Commonwealth Court Officer Policy
Procedures Manual ch. 4, § 6 (2010); N.M. CHILD CT. R. 10-223A.
'19McLaurin discusses the special characteristics of adolescents that make them especially
vulnerable to being harmed by physical restraints. See McLaurin, supra note 116, at 227-31.
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shackling. The rule also exists to protect the presumption of innocence, a
person's right to appear before the court with dignity and self-respect, and
an individual's ability to communicate with counsel and assist in the
case.1 20 Accordingly, the court held that an individual should not be
required to appear in restraints without a showing of necessity, "whether
there is to be a bench trial or a trial by jury."l 2 1 The court further found that
concerns about courtroom security do not provide sufficient justification for
requiring restraints where there is no evidence of a threat of escape.122
Two California appellate courts similarly prohibited indiscriminate
shackling in juvenile proceedings but adopted a lower standard than applies
during a criminal jury trial.1 2 3 In Deshaun M, the court held that "while
there are dangers in using unwarranted shackling at a juvenile hearing, they
are not as substantial as those presented during a jury trial and a lesser
showing should suffice." 24 In Tiffany A., the appellate court further
explained that the burden remains on the government to establish the
"need" for restraints and that the trial court, not law enforcement personnel,
must decide whether restraints are appropriate in a given case.1 25 The court
also extracted two general principles from the California case law. First, the
amount of "need" that the court must find to justify restraints depends on
the type of proceeding.1 2 6 Second, the court must make an individualized
determination of whether restraints are necessary; restraints cannot be
justified solely by someone's status in custody, lack of security personnel,
or the inadequacy of the court facilities.1 27 These principles are useful for
considering how restraints should be handled in immigration proceedings,
which share the quasi-criminal qualities of juvenile adjudications. 28

120See In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d at 73.
121Id at 74.
1 2 2 1d

123In re Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 630 (Ct. App. 2007) ("some showing of necessity
for the use of physical restraints at a juvenile jurisdictional hearing should be required"); Tiffany
A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 371, 373 (Ct. App. 2007) ("any decision to shackle a
minor who appears in the Juvenile Delinquency Court for a court proceeding must be based on the

non-conforming conduct and behavior of that individual minor").
124
Deshaun M, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630.
12 Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 371-72.
1261Id. at 372.
127id.
28

See Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case For a Right to Mental
Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 957-59 (2014).
1
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B. A ProceduralDue ProcessAnalysis ofRestraints in Removal
Proceedings
ICE's practice of indiscriminately shackling immigration detainees
raises two important procedural due process concerns. First, it permits
detained noncitizens to be restrained in court without any type of
individualized determination. Second, the 1988 MOU allows ICE, an
adversarial party, to make the final decision about the need for restraints.
Only one court so far has addressed the use of restraints in removal
proceedings. In Reid, Judge Michael Posner of the U.S. District Court in
Massachusetts held that procedural due process requires an individualized
determination of the need for restraints. 129 However, the court did not find a
due process violation based on the judge's delegation of decision-making
authority to ICE in that case because the court concluded that the judge
would have reached the same decision given the respondent's criminal
record. The only other litigation involving the use of restraints in removal
proceedings was a California class action that challenged the indiscriminate
use of restraints in the San Francisco Immigration Court. Since that case
resulted in a settlement agreement, it did not yield judicial guidance about
the due process analysis.130
In determining whether government action violates procedural due
process, courts generally apply the three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge.1 3 1
This test requires the court to consider: (1) the private interest that will be
affected; (2) the government's interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail; and (3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
private interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
129 Reid v. Donelan, 2 F. Supp. 3d 38, 48 (D. Mass. 2014).
13oDe Abadia-Peixoto v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 277 F.R.D. 572, 574 (N.D. Cal.
2011); Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement at 2, De Abadia-Peixoto v. U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 277 F.R.D. 572 (No. 3:11 -cv-4001 RS). The California class action raised both
procedural and substantive due process claims. The Supreme Court has recognized freedom from
restraints as a fundamental right in other contexts. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
316 (1982) (recognizing, in a case involving the use of restraints during involuntary civil
commitment, that freedom from physical restraints "always has been recognized as the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause" but declining to apply strict scrutiny); Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993) (stating that freedom from physical restraint is "at the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action"); Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) ("Freedom from imprisonment... detention, or other forms of
physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.").
13'424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.1 32 Each of these three
factors is discussed below.
1. The Private. Interest at Stake
In Allen and Deck, the Supreme Court identified several ways that the
use of restraints during a jury trial negatively affects a defendant's liberty
interests. These include: (1) undermining the dignity of the proceedings; (2)
preventing the defendant from participating fully in his or her defense,
including impeding the ability to communicate with counsel; and (3)
biasing the jury against the defendant and thereby undermining the
presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the fact-finding
process.1 33 These same interests are jeopardized when a noncitizen is forced
to appear in restraints in immigration court. Although there is no right to a
jury in removal proceedings, restraints can still jeopardize the fairness of
the fact-finding process.
a. The Detainee'sInterest in a DignifiedProceeding
Placing a person in shackles is dehumanizing and diminishes the dignity
of any type of proceeding. In describing the degradation that restraints
inflict, Judge Cardamone on the Second Circuit painted a vivid picture of a
defendant being "needlessly paraded about a courtroom, like a dancing bear
on a lead, wearing belly chains and manacles."l 3 4 Similarly, Judge Posner
on the Seventh Circuit has recognized that a restrained defendant has the
appearance of a "mad dog."1 35 In Reid, the court's procedural due process
analysis of the indiscriminate use of restraints in removal proceedings
focused primarily on the dignity interest, finding it "just as dehumanizingand, no doubt, demoralizing-to shackle a detainee in an immigration court
as it would be to shackle him in a criminal court."l 36 The court stated that
"[t]o deny or minimize an individual's dignity in an immigration
proceeding, or to treat this essential attribute of human worth as anything
less than fundamental simply because an immigration proceeding is titularly

132 id
33

1

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630-31 (2005); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 377, 344

(1970).
34
1 United

States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 105-106 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cardamone, J., concurring).
Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926, 927 (7th Cir. 2014).
36
1 Reid v. Donelan, 2 F. Supp. 3d 38, 45 (D. Mass. 2014).
135
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civil, would be an affront to due process and entirely inconsistent with the
values underlying Deck." 3 7

In describing removal proceedings as "titularly civil," Reid recognized
the significance of what is at stake, rendering the need for a dignified
proceeding all the more important. The Supreme Court has long noted that
deportation may result in the loss of life or "of all that makes life worth
living" and more recently described it as "an integral part-indeed,
sometimes the most important part--of the penalty" that results from a
conviction.138 Given that deportation can be a more draconian consequence
than criminal punishment, the need to protect dignity in a removal
proceeding is no less important than in a criminal proceeding.
Yet the indignity of restraints may be felt more acutely by detainees in
removal proceedings than criminal defendants because of the striking rift
between the informal surroundings of immigration court and the seriousness
of what is at stake. Immigration judges themselves have decried the
undignified system in which they work, where they hear "what amount to
death penalty cases . . . in traffic court settings."l 39 Dana Leigh Marks, who
has served as an Immigration Judge in San Francisco since 1987 and is
president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, describes the
immigration courts as the "mistreated stepchildren" of the Department of
Justice or "Cinderella" courts. 140 For respondents to appear in restraints in
this downtrodden system is an indignity within an indignity, which
amplifies the appearance of injustice.
b.

The Detainee'sInterest in ParticipatingFully in the
Proceedings

Since the court in Reid found that an immigration detainee's dignity
interest alone demanded some type of individualized determination of the
need for restraints, it did not need to analyze the other liberty interests at
stake. However, in characterizing the dignity interest as "[t]he factor most
clearly present in the immigration context," the court may also have

138

Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1480 (2010).
139Dana Leigh Marks, Opinion, Immigration Judge: Death Penalty Cases in a Traffic Court
Setting, CNN (June 26, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/26/opinion/imnigration-judgebroken-systen/.
140id
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underestimated the relevance of the other factors to immigration
proceedings. 141 Restraints affect the ability of immigration detainees to
participate in their defense at least as much as they affect criminal
defendants. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as well as procedural due
process, guarantees a detainee's rights to testify, cross-examine witnesses,
examine the evidence, and have counsel at one's own expense.1 42 In
addition, respondents in removal proceedings almost always testify, making
the presence of restraints more salient than in criminal cases, where the
defendant usually invokes the right to remain silent and therefore has a
more passive presence in the courtroom.
For detainees who are lucky enough to be represented, the impediment
to communicating with counsel remains the same as in criminal cases. The
impact of restraints is even worse, however, for the majority of immigration
detainees who are unrepresented, as the detainee alone must carry out all
the functions of counsel, including taking the testimony of any witnesses,
handling documents, and arguing the case.1 4 3 In Davidson, a civil rights
case brought by a prisoner, the Second Circuit recognized the heightened
impact of restraints on an unrepresented litigant, expressing dismay that the
trial court had "refused to consider removal of Davidson's handcuffs even
though as a pro se litigant he would be conspicuously hampered in the
handling of his papers" and had to "hobble in leg-irons from counsel table
to the bench" after each round of questioning.'"
Not only do restraints physically interfere with a litigant's ability to
participate fully in the hearing, but they also create psychological
impairments to participation. Nineteenth century cases such as Harrington
recognized that restraints impair a defendant's mental faculties, but this line
of reasoning has received less attention in modem cases because judges
attribute the concern over mental impairment in early cases to the physical
pain that restraints inflicted at that time.1 45 Courts now tend to note the
psychological impact of restraints primarily in situations where an extreme
type of restraint is used or where the restraints are applied for a particularly
141Reid v. Donelan, 2 F. Supp. 3d 38, 45 (D. Mass. 2014).

1428 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012).
143Legal Representation Needed to Fill Justice Gap, Says Immigration Panel, A.B.A. (Aug.
10, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2014/08/

representation isla.html (stating that 83% of immigration detainees are unrepresented).
'"Davidson v. Riley, 44 F.3d 1118, 1126 (2d Cir. 1995).
45
1 People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1891); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630
(2005).
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long time and therefore may become quite physically painful. For instance,
the Ninth Circuit has recognized that being forced to wear a stun belt in
court prevents a defendant from "concentrate[ing] adequately on his
testimony because of the stress, confusion and frustration."l 4 6 Likewise, the
Eleventh Circuit has found that a stun belt impairs "the defendant's ability
to take an active interest in the presentation of his case."' 4 7
An example of a case where the court recognized the psychological
impact of restraints that had been applied for a long time is Spain v. Rushen,
which involved a member of the Black Panther Party imprisoned at San
Quentin and restrained during his seventeen-month trial.1 4 8 The expert
psychologist testified, "Spain was so depressed and pessimistic and beaten
by the chains, that I don't believe he was capable of cooperating [in his
defense] in a reasonable way."l 49 Spain himself submitted a declaration
with his habeas petition describing the effect of the restraints, stating, "I get
exasperated and cannot concentrate." 150 He also filed an affidavit explaining
that the restraints exacted "a severe physical and psychological strain."''
The Ninth Circuit accordingly found that "[s]hackles may impair the
defendant's mental faculties."' 5 2 The court further observed that the
magistrate judge below had found that "the subject of shackles practically
consumed Spain's attention and significantly detracted from his ability to
prepare for his own defense." 5 3
In immigration cases, restraints involve at most handcuffs, leg irons, and
belly chains, not stun belts, and the average length of detention is one
month, which is much shorter than the seventeen-month trial in Spain's
case.1 54 But this does not mean that restraints have an insignificant
psychological impact. On the contrary, the discussion in Part V below
suggests that courts may be grossly underestimating how much restraints
affect both cognition and behavior even when there is no physical pain
Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 900-903 (9th Cir. 2003).
States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2002).
148 Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712
(1989).
146

147United

149

Id. at 717.

" 0 d. at 722.
51
' id.
52
1 Id.

at 721 (citing Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 105-06 (6th Cir. 1973)).
"'Id. at 722.
15Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, TRAC IMMIGRATION (June 3,
2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/321/ (stating that 70 percent of ICE detainees were
released within the first 30 days, although thousands remained detained for much longer).
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involved. That discussion is therefore highly relevant to understanding how
restraints affect an individual's ability to participate fully in the
proceedings.
c.

The Detainee'sInterest in a Fairand UnbiasedProcess

Although there is no right to a jury trial in immigration court, restraints
may bias the immigration judge, which would undermine the fairness of the
fact-finding process. As discussed above, some courts have recognized that
procedural due process requires an individualized assessment of the need
for restraints even when the adjudicator is a judge. Most of these cases
reach that conclusion by emphasizing the need to protect the litigant's
dignity and ability to participate in the proceedings, ignoring the possibility
of prejudice by the judge. But there are some exceptions, such as New
York's highest court, which acknowledged that "judges are human" and
vulnerable to unconscious biases."'
In the immigration context, the risk of unconscious or implicit bias by
the judge is especially high due to the difficult conditions in which
immigration judges work, their high rates of stress and burnout, and the
types of decisions they make. 15 6 Studies have shown that the conditions of
decision-making play a critical role in the behavioral expression of implicit
biases by either promoting or impeding deliberative thinking.' 5 7 Judges are
more likely to think deliberatively when they take their time to make
decisions, provide written opinions, and receive feedback.'5 8 Unfortunately,
immigration judges have none of these luxuries." 9 They carry enormous
caseloads and normally issue oral decisions as soon as a merits hearing is
over. 160 Written decisions are rare, even in complex cases.161 Feedback is
also uncommon, since only a small fraction of cases are appealed. 162

5
'5 People v. Best, 979 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (2012).
156 This argument was discussed in detail in an earlier article. See Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit
Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417,417 (2011) [hereinafter Implicit Bias].
57

See Jerry Kang et al, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1175 (2012)
[hereinafter Bias in the Courtroom]; Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges
Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV 1, 33 (2007) [hereinafter Blinking on the Bench].
158 Blinking on the Bench, supra note 157, at 33-35.
15ImplicitBias, supra note 156, at 428-41.
16Id. at 431, 433.
161Id. at 433.
16 2

Id at440_41
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A single immigration judge handles, on average, 1,500 cases per year,
which is over three times the average caseload of federal judges.163 In
Houston, one of the busiest immigration courts, six judges have about 6,000
cases each. 164 An article published in The Washington Post described a
judge on the Arlington Immigration Court who had to decide 26 cases
before lunch, which meant spending just seven minutes per case.165
Lawyers call this type of schedule a "rocket docket." 66 Making matters
worse, immigration judges have little support staff to help manage these
huge caseloads, and four judges often share a single law clerk.1 6 7
Consequently, immigration judges suffer from extremely high levels of
stress and burnout.' 68 A 2007 survey found that immigration judges
"reported more burnout than any other group of professionals ... including
prison wardens and physicians in busy hospitals."l 69 Immigration judges
complained about the amount of work, the constant pressure to complete
cases, the extemporaneous nature of oral decisions, and the denial of access
70
One judge succinctly stated, "There is not enough time to
to transcripts.o
7
think.""' Not surprisingly, judges reported low motivation, depression, and
exhaustion; they also demonstrated significant symptoms of secondary
traumatic stress.1 72 One judge described the job as a "factory assembly line"
while another compared it to the "drip-drip-drip of Chinese water
"'73
torture ....
163 Daniel Costa, Overloaded Immigration Courts: With Too Few Judges, Hundreds of

Thousands of Immigrants Wait Nearly Two Years for a Hearing, ECON. POL'Y INST. (July 24,
2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/immigration-court-caseload-skyrocketing/.
1
6Laura Wides-Munoz, Nearly Half Immigration Judges Eligible to Retire, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 22, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nearly-half-immigration-judges-eligible-retire.
Eli Saslow, In a Crowded Immigration Court, Seven Minutes to Decide a Family's Future,
WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-a-crowded-immigrationcourt-seven-minutes-to-decide-a-familys-future/2014/02/02/518c3e3e-8798-lle3-a5bd844629433ba3_story.html.
66
Id.
67

I
Implicit
Bias, supra note 156, at 433.
1 See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges' Chambers: NarrativeResponses from the
NationalAssociation ofImmigration Judges Stress andBurnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57,
58-59 (2008).
Id. at 60.
68

"old.
171
Id.
172Id.
173Id.

at 64-65.
at 66.
at 57, 66, 71, 74.
at 65, 72.
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These conditions and emotions all encourage reliance on intuition,
rather than conscious, deliberative thought, which takes more time and
energy.1 7 4 When humans make judgments under pressure, they tend to rely
more on stereotypes, consider less information and fewer kinds of
information, use the information in a shallower way, give more weight to
negative information, and make less accurate decisions. 175 Feeling tired,
distracted, or rushed also increases the chance of responding based on
automatic impulses. 76 The less motivation an individual has, the harder it
becomes to suppress implicit biases.1 7 7 Thus, the general state of
immigration judges paints a dire picture for making deliberative and
objective judgments.
The types of decisions that immigration judges make only exacerbate
this situation. ' Many decisions are discretionary, requiring minimal
justification. Decisions about whether to grant bond and many types of
applications, including asylum, cancellation of removal, and various
waivers, are all discretionary.' 79 When judges are exercising discretion, they
often do not go through the exercise of explaining their reasoning, which
eliminates one of the checks on implicit bias. 80 Just as trial court judges
have been found to rely more on intuitive processing when they have
greater discretion and less when bound by a web of rules, immigration
judges operating in the arena of discretion are more likely to express
implicit attitudes.' 8 ' Immigration judges also make critical determinations
about credibility that are very difficult to reverse on appeal. 18 2 An
immigration judge may easily rely on intuition and reference demeanor as
the reason for an adverse credibility decision, without even realizing how
implicit biases affected his or her perceptions of the respondent. 83
These background conditions make immigration judges particularly
vulnerable to implicit biases, including being biased by the sight of
174

See Implicit Bias, supra note 156, at 430-31.

1 See id. at 431.
16
Id. at 431-32.
17

1Id. at 436.

'See id. at 437.
79
1 See id.
"soSee id. at 437-38.
18 See Blinking on the Bench, supra note 157, at 28-29; see also Implicit Bias, supra note
156, at 437-38.
182
See Implicit Bias, supra note 156, at 438, 440-41.
'See id. at 438-39.
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restraints. Part V deepens this analysis by examining a range of empirical
studies that help show why the sight of restraints, specifically, might have a
prejudicial effect on a judge.
2. The Government's Interest in Security
Balanced against the detainee's hefty liberty interests is the
government's interest in maintaining security. Security in federal, state, and
local courts has become an increasingly important issue over the past
decade. The U.S. Marshals Service reports that the number of judicial threat
investigations at the federal level increased from 592 cases in FY 2003 to
1,238 cases in FY 201 1.184 In state and local courts, the number of violent
incidents has increased every year since 1970, reaching 67 in 2011.1"
Maintaining security in immigration courts is particularly challenging due
to overcrowded courtrooms and the absence of any bailiffs.1 8 6 These two
factors arguably make it especially difficult to prevent incidents of violence
and flight without the use of restraints.
In fact, immigration judges themselves have expressed concerns about
courtroom security. In October 2013, after litigation was initiated in
Massachusetts challenging ICE's indiscriminate use of restraints, the local
ICE office actually changed its policy to provide for individualized
assessments by ICE of the need for restraints.' 87 The immigration judges in
that area, however, expressed safety concerns about the new policy, which
led ICE to hold it in abeyance and revert to its prior practice of blanket
shackling.' 8 8 The fact that the immigration judges did not feel safe with
individualized determinations suggests that this procedure may not be
adequate to protect the government's interest in security.

'Tim Fautsko, Steve Berson, and Steve Swensen, Courthouse Security Incidents Trending
Upward: The Challenges Facing State Courts Today, 2012 FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS
102, http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdn/ref/collection/facilities/id/163.
...
Id. at 103.
6
' The National Association of [mmigration Judges, The State of Our Courts: A View from
the Inside, (2013), http://journalism.berkeley.edu/conf/2014/imnmigration/wp-content/uploads/
2014/04/NAIJ-The-State-of-Our-Courts-4-13-13.pdf;
Kevin
Diaz,
Overburdened and
Underfunded, ImmigrationJudges Decry 'Cinderella'CourtSystem, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug.
27, 2014, available at http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/Overburdened-and-under
funded-immigration-judges-5717090.php.
187Reid v. Donelan, 2 F. Supp. 3d 38, 42 (D. Mass. 2014).
188d.

246

BAYLOR LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 67: 1

Yet several persuasive counterarguments can be made that
individualized determinations are indeed sufficient to maintain security in
the courtroom. These arguments highlight: (1) the overwhelmingly
nonviolent background of immigration detainees; (2) existing classification
systems for detainees based on security risk; and (3) ICE's historical
practice of using restraints only when an individualized assessment
indicated necessity. Each of these arguments is discussed below.
a. Characteristicsof the DetainedPopulation
While some immigration judges may feel unsafe unless all detainees are
restrained in the courtroom, the characteristics of the detained population
suggest that such fears are largely unfounded. In 2013, ICE reported that
40.5% of the immigration detainees in custody had no criminal record
whatsoever. 189 Likewise, data from 2011 demonstrate that 40.8% of
immigration detainees had no criminal record. 190 Of the 59.2% with a
criminal record, most had been convicted of nonviolent offenses, such as
DUIs (13.5%), traffic offenses (7.0%), marijuana possession (5.4%),
cocaine possession (5.1%), larceny (3.8%); cocaine sale (2.9%), and illegal
entry (2.9%).19' Only 4.6% of immigration detainees had been convicted of
assault, 2.6% of robbery, and 4.8% of "dangerous drugs."l92 An internal
review conducted by the Department of Homeland Security in 2009
confirmed that only a small percentage of immigration detainees (11%) had
been convicted of a violent crime and described "the majority of the
population" as "low custody, or having a low propensity for violence."l 9 3

89 See Miroff, supra note 16 (stating that ICE reported that only 19,864 of the 33,391
detainees in its custody on September 9, 2013 were convicted criminals).
'"Issue Brief Interior Immigration Enforcement By the Numbers, BIPARTISAN POLICY
CENTER 8 (2014), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/files/Interior
%20Immigration%20Enforcement.pdf.
19 1Id.
92
1
d.
93

' U.S.

DEPARTMENT

ENFORCEMENT,

OF

HOMELAND

SECURITY,

IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND

IMMIGRATION

AND

CUSTOMS

RECOMMENDATIONS

2 (2009),

http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdflice-detention-rpt.pdf;
see also Few ICE
Detainers Target Serious Criminals, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Sept. 17, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/330/. The data analyzed by TRAC shows no more than 14% of ICE detainers
issued in FY 2012 and the first four months of FY 2013 targeted individuals who pose a serious
threat to public safety or national security. About half of the 347,691 individuals subject to an ICE
detainer had no record of a criminal conviction. If traffic violations, including driving while
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Furthermore, even if a detainee has been convicted of a violent crime,
the conviction alone may not justify the need for shackles. In a decision
holding that a past felony conviction was not a sufficient reason to impose
restraints on the defendant at trial, the Ninth Circuit explained that "[i]n all
the cases in which shackling has been approved, there has also been
evidence of disruptive courtroom behavior, attempts to escape from
custody, assaults or attempted assaults while in custody, or a pattern of
defiant behavior toward corrections officials and judicial authorities."l 9 4
Thus, it is an individual's behavior while in custody, rather than prior
crimes, that is most important in determining whether restraints are
necessary in the courtroom.
Finally, there are no publicly available reports of violence or flight by
noncitizens in immigration court, even in non-detained proceedings where
restraints are not used. A report published in 2012 by the Center for Judicial
and Executive Security documents 238 incidents of violence, including
disrupted incidents, in various courts around the country between January
2005 and December 2011, none of which occurred in an immigration
court.' 9 These data cumulatively indicate that only a small fraction of
immigration detainees pose a risk to security.
b. Efficient Assessments ofIndividualizedRisk
Even if only one in ten detainees has a violent background, immigration
judges and ICE may still support blanket restraints if they do not have
confidence that they can identify those who do pose a risk. Specifically,
they may worry that they do not have the capacity, in terms of time and
resources, to conduct sufficiently thorough assessments of the risk posed by
each detainee. One response to these capacity-based concerns is that ICE
already classifies detainees based on security risk. 196 ICE's Risk
intoxicated, and marijuana possession are omitted, two thirds of all detainers were for individuals
with no record of conviction.
194 Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 749 (9th Cir. 1995).
19 Steven K. Swensen, CTR. FOR JUDICIAL & EXEC. SEC., Disorder in the Court: Incidents of
Courthouse Violence: List of Court-TargetedViolence 2005-Present(2012), http://www.cjes
consultants.com/assets/documents/CJES-JCVl-Disorder-in-the-Court-Incidents-IV.pdf.
96

1 See ICE, INS DETENTION STANDARD: DETAINEE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, at 2 (2002),

http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/classif.pdf;

ICE, ICE/DRO DETENTION

(2008), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards
PERFORMANCE BASED DETENTION STANDARDS § 2.2, at 70-

STANDARD: CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
/pdf/classification system.pdf; ICE,

89 (2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/201 1/classification system.pdf.
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Classification Assessment system generates standardized recommendations
for detention or release, bond amount, custody classification level, and
community supervision level based on "a variety of forms and systems,
including: criminal history, history of disciplinary infractions, possible gang
involvement, and equities regarding the individual's ties to the local
community." 1 97 This information should help assess whether a detainee
presents a safety or flight risk and is therefore highly relevant to evaluating
the need for restraints.
c.

ICE's PastPracticesand Policies Regarding Restraints

Finally, ICE's own past policies and practices around restraints indicate
that individualized determinations of the need for restraints sufficiently
protect the government's interest in security. Prior to 2012, ICE required
individualized determinations of the need for restraints during
transportation, where safety concerns are comparable to a courtroom in that
detainees are taken outside of secure facility.198 A 2004 memo instructed
each officer to "make an assessment of the detainee's risks to the public, the
escorting officer(s), himself or herself, as well as the likelihood of
absconding when determining whether to use restraints."' 99 This assessment
had to include "at a minimum, a review of the detainee's criminal violations
(if any), aggressive or anti-social behavior, suspected influence of alcohol
or drugs, physical condition, sex, age, and medical condition." 2 00 Officers
also had to "take into consideration the nature of the assignment such as
type of detainee, length of travel, destination and exposure of the individual
to the public." 2 0 1
Similarly, a 2008 memo required officers to make an individualized
determination about the need for restraints "based on an articulated reason,"
taking into consideration "all known information of escape risks, criminal
background or involvement, potential threat to national security, violence,

'97 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT
(RCA) OVERVIEW, 2013 (on file with author).
98
See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
'"Memorandum from Victor Cerda, Acting Director of ICE, entitled Use of Restraints (Jul.
20, 2004).
20 0

id

20 1

d
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victim of sex crimes, or medical indications to escorting officers."202
Although in 2012 ICE issued a new memo calling for the blanket use of
restraints during transportation, there is no indication that this change was
due to inadequate security during the preceding years when individualized
determination were used. 203 The change could have been made for the sake
of convenience or as a precautionary measure to ensure that no security
breaches would occur in the future.
Furthermore, no changes have been made to ICE's three sets of
detention standards, issued in 2000, 2008, and 2011, which continue to
require an individualized analysis of the need for restraints during
transportation. 204 Currently, different detention facilities around the country
currently follow different sets of standards, since the newer ones are being
rolled out slowly. The standards on land transportation all indicate that
detainees should be restrained only if their "documents or behavior in
transit indicate a security risk." 205 Officers must document the reason for
using restraints, the type of restraints, and the times when the restraints are
applied and removed. 206 The only categorical approach to the use of
restraints in these standards pertains to protecting vulnerable groups.
Specifically, the standards provide that women and children should not be
restrained during transportation absent an exceptional situation. 207 If a c
by-case analysis of security risk is good enough for transportation outside

202Memorandum from John P. Torres, Director of ICE, entitled Update
to the Detention and
Deportation Officers Field Manual: Appendix 16-4, Part 2; Enforcement StandardPertainingto
the Escorting ofAliens (Jan. 31, 2008).
203 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations, Use

of Restraints 1 1.2, Policy Number: ERO 111.55.1, issued and effective Nov. 19, 2012 (on file
with author).
204 See infra note 205.
20

51INS, NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS:

TRANSPORTATION 7 (2000) [Transportation

2000], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/transp.pdf; PERFORMANCE BASED
NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS: TRANSPORTATION (by Land) 9 (2008) [Transportation
2008],
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/transportation by land.pdf;
PERFORMANCE BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS:

TRANSPORTATION (by Land) 49

(2011) [Transportation 2011], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/20 11/transportation
byland.pdf.
206
Transportation 2000, supra note 205; Transportation 2008, supra note 205; Transportation
2011, supranote 205.
207
Transportation 2000, supra note 205, at 14; Transportation 2008, supra note 205, at
12.
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of the detention center, then it should also be sufficient to address security
concerns when detainees are taken to court. 2 08

3. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The third factor of the Mathews test requires examining the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the private interests through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards. Indiscriminate shackling poses a high risk of erroneous
deprivation for the simple reason that most immigration detainees pose no
safety threat or flight risk. As previously noted, over 40% of immigration
detainees have no criminal record and only about 10-11% have been
convicted of a violent crime.2 09 Restraining all detainees therefore leads to
depriving the vast majority of them of their liberty interests even though
they pose no threat to security. Providing individualized determinations
would dramatically reduce the wrongful deprivation of liberty just by
identifying and shackling only the small fraction of detainees who actually
pose a safety or flight risk.
A procedure that requires individualized determinations but permits
them to be made by ICE is better than allowing indiscriminate shackling but
20

8The

use of restraints inside

detention facilities also requires

an individualized
determination, but there may be fewer security concerns within a detention facility than when
detainees are taken outside. See INS, NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS: USE OF FORCE 1, 2, 5
(2000), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdfluseoffor.pdf; ICE, PERFORMANCEBASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2008: USE OF FORCE AND RESTRAINTS 3, 9 (2008)

[Restraints 2008], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/use of force and
restraints.pdf; ICE, PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011: USE OF
FORCE AND RESTRAINTS 210, 216 (2011) [Restraints 2011], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention
-standards/201 1/use of force andrestraints.pdf. The 2008 standard sets forth three special
classes of detainees where consultation with medical staff is required prior to the use of force or
restraints: (1) pregnant detainees, where a medical professional should help determine the
necessity of restraint as well as the safest method of restraint in order to protect the fetus; (2)
detainees with wounds or cuts; and (3) detainees with special medical or mental health needs. See
Restraints 2008 at 6. Under the 2011 standard, a woman who is pregnant or recuperating after
delivery may not be restrained during transport, in a detention center, or at an outside medical
facility absent truly extraordinary circumstances, and a woman in active labor or delivery may
never be restrained. See Restraints 2011 at 213. These developments appear related to increased
attention to the harms caused by shackling pregnant prisoners. See, e.g., Nelson v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 533 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that shackling during childbirth violates the
Eighth Amendment); Priscilla A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the
Shackling ofPregnantPrisoners,100 CALIF. L. REv. 1239, 1255-58 (2012).
209

See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
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still carries a significant risk of erroneous deprivation. Allowing ICE, an
adversarial party, to determine whether restraints are needed carries an
inherent risk of error for at least two reasons. First, ICE has a motive to
restrain detainees simply to make its own job of maintaining security in the
courtroom easier. Second, as the party seeking deportation, ICE may decide
to shackle detainees just to make it harder for them to fight their cases.
In other types of civil cases, courts have squarely held that a judge
cannot delegate the responsibility to determine the need for physical
restraints to security officers who are an adversarial party.210 Judge Posner
on the Seventh Circuit, for example, has described a trial judge's abdication
of this responsibility as an absence and abuse of discretion, not an exercise
of discretion. 2 11 In Lemons, which involved a prisoner-plaintiff who was
brought to the courthouse in handcuffs and leg-irons for a civil rights trial
about excessive force by prison guards, the trial judge denied a request to
have the restraints removed, stating, "[S]ince Mr. Lemons is in the custody
of the Department of Corrections, they set the rules for how he will be
restrained, if at all." 212 The Seventh Circuit held that the judge had "abused
his discretion by relying on the self-serving opinion of fellow penal officers
of the defendants and not holding a hearing to determine what, if any,
restraints were necessary." 2 13 The court explained:
The judge may not delegate his discretion to another party.
While he could have consulted the Department of
Corrections employees or court security officers, and
listened to their opinions and the reasons in support of
them, he had to consider all the evidence and ultimately
make the decision himself. Instead he delegated the
decision to the Department of Corrections employees. To
nobody's surprise, they said he should keep Lemons in
handcuffs and leg irons. That delegation was particularly
dangerous here where all of the defendants were also
Department of Corrections employees, so that the decision
maker could hardly be called impartial.2 14

210 See, e.g., Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1993).
211id.
212

Id. at 356 (quoting magistrate judge).

213Id.
214
Id.; see also Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244, 248 (7th Cir. 1993) ("While the trial court may
rely 'heavily' on the marshals in evaluating the appropriate security measures to take with a given
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Similarly, in Davidson, which also involved a civil rights lawsuit against
correctional personnel, the Second Circuit found that the trial court had
"abdicated its responsibility to determine the need for the physical
restraints" by "leaving the decision to the [Department of Corrections]
guards." 215 The Second Circuit stressed that it was the trial court's duty to
engage in the due process analysis that required balancing the litigant's
interest in being free of shackles against considerations of security.216
Lemons and Davidson are particularly helpful in examining the use of
restraints in immigration court because they underscore the impropriety of
relying on a security officer's judgment when that officer has an interest in
the case. 2 17 These cases provide more relevant guidance than criminal cases
like Zuber and Howard, where the trial judge was allowed to defer to the
recommendations of the Marshals Service, because the Marshals Service
was not an adversarial party in the criminal proceedings.218 Immigration
cases are analogous to Lemons and Davidson because the issue is whether
ICE, an adversarial party, is allowed to make self-serving decisions about
the use of restraints.

prisoner, the court bears the ultimate responsibility for that determination and may not delegate
the decision to shackle an inmate to the marshals."); Hameed v. Mann, 57 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir.
1995); Sides v. Cherry, 609 F.3d 576, 581 (3d Cir. 2010).
21 5
Davidson v. Riley, 44 F.3d 1118, 1125 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Hameed, 57 F.3d at 222
("In determining what restraints are necessary, the court cannot properly delegate that decision to
guards or other prison officials but must decide that question for itself ... If the court has
deferred entirely to those guarding the prisoner, it has failed to exercise its discretion.").
216
Davidson, 44 F.3d atl 125 (2d Cir. 1995). In addition, the trial judge had erred by failing to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the need for restraints and failing to make any substantial effort
to minimize their prejudicial effect. Id. at 1225-26.
217
See id. at 1125; Lemons, 985 F.3d at 358. Where judges have been allowed to delegate
certain decisions to someone with a particular kind of expertise, that person must be an
independent decision-maker to comport with procedural due process. For example, in Harper,
where the Supreme Court held that a medical professional may authorize the administration of
involuntary medication to a mentally ill prisoner who posed a danger to himself or others, the
Court explained that the Due Process Clause "has never been thought to require that the neutral
and detached trier offact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer." Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231 (1990) (emphasis added). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 60709 (1979) ("[D]ue process is not violated by use of informal, traditional medical investigative
techniques.... The mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of
judges").
2 18
United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Howard, 480
F.3d 1005, 1012-14 (9th Cir. 2007).
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In other contexts, the BIA and federal appellate courts have recognized
that the immigration judge may not delegate authority to ICE because it is
an adversarial party, and the regulations require the judge to exercise
"independent judgment and discretion." 219 For example, in holding that
ICE's opposition to a motion to reopen cannot be the sole basis for denial,
several appellate courts have reasoned that an adversarial party may not be
given this type of unilateral power, which also prevents meaningful
review. 22 0 The BIA has agreed that an immigration judge cannot be required
to defer to ICE's position on a motion to reopen, although the judge should
take it into consideration.22 1 Similarly, the BIA has held that an immigration
judge must independently evaluate the basis of ICE's position regarding
whether a continuance is appropriate to apply for adjustment of status,
which is the process of becoming a lawful permanent resident.222 The BIA
has also concluded that an immigration judge must exercise independent
judgment in deciding whether to administratively close removal
proceedings over ICE's objection, which results in the case being taken off
the active docket.223
These decisions all indicate that it is just as improper to defer to an
adversarial party in removal proceedings as in any other type of case. While
the use of restraints can be distinguished from other types of decisions
because of ICE's expertise in matters related to security, allowing ICE to
have the final word on whether a detainee will be shackled creates a serious
risk of erroneous deprivation. Requiring the immigration judge to make an
independent determination after understanding the basis of ICE's security
concerns and listening to the detainee's response would significantly reduce
2198 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2014).
220

See Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that the BIA
failed to "justify the imposition of a mechanism by which the DHS ... may unilaterally block a
motion to reopen"); Sarr v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 354, 363 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that "affording
such importance to [DHS opposition to a motion to reopen] would effectively remove all authority
over the granting or denial of such motions by the Board and place it solely within the hands of
one of the adversarial parties to the proceedings"); Ahmed v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 768, 772 (9th
Cir. 2008) ("[a]llowing the adversarial party to a proceeding to unilaterally block a motion, for

any or no reason, deprives the BIA, and by extension this court, of any meaningful review").
221ln re Lamus-Pava, 25 I. & N. Dec. 61, 65 (BIA 2009) (clarifying that "DHS's arguments
advanced in opposition to a motion should be considered in adjudicating a motion, but they should
not preclude the Immigration Judge or the Board from exercising 'independent judgment and
discretion' in ruling on the motion").
222In re Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 790-91 (BIA 2009).
223
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 691 (BIA 2012).
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the risk of error that stems from allowing an adversarial party, with all of its
inherent biases, to make this critical decision.
Part V below adds another lawyer to the analysis of the risk of
erroneous deprivation by explaining the potential cognitive and behavioral
impact of restraints on both the litigant and the judge. Specifically, the
empirical studies discussed in Part V suggest that restraints may increase
the likelihood that a deportation order will be issued in error by making the
respondent more passive and triggering the judge's implicit biases. If these
studies were taken into consideration when applying the Mathews test, the
risk of erroneous deprivation would be even greater.
4. Analysis of the Three Mathews Factors
This discussion has shown that immigration detainees have private
interests that are just as compelling, if not more compelling, than the private
interests at stake in criminal and other types of civil cases. At the same
time, the government has a compelling interest in maintaining security, with
the special challenges presented by overcrowded and understaffed
immigration courtrooms. Requiring individualized determinations of the
need for restraints is a procedural solution that fairly balances these
competing interests, especially since around 90% of detainees have not
been convicted of a violent crime and a classification system already exists
to help identify those who do pose security risks. Furthermore, it is critical
that immigration judges, not ICE, make these individualized determinations
to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation. This conclusion is consistent
with the holdings of numerous civil cases requiring the trial judge to make
individualized determinations about the need for restraints and prohibiting
delegation of this duty to correctional officers who are an adversarial party.
C. The Issue of Prejudice
If an individual challenges a deportation order based on a due process
violation, reversal would normally require a showing of prejudice, which
means the individual must demonstrate that the violation may have affected
the outcome of the proceedings.22 4 Of course, if a noncitizen seeks to enjoin
the due process violation from occurring in the first place, no showing of

224 See,

e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793-94 (9th Cir. 2005); Dakane v. U.S.
Atty. Gen., 371 F.3d 771, 775 (11th Cir. 2004); Garza-Moreno v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 239, 341
(6th Cir. 2007); Rusu v. U.S. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2002).
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prejudice is required.225 In determining whether a due process violation
involving the use of restraints constituted prejudicial or harmless error,
appellate courts have considered several factors, including "the strength of
the case in favor of the prevailing party and what effect the restraints might
have had given the nature of the issues and evidence involved in the
trial."226 Courts have paid particular attention to whether dangerousness or
credibility is a central issue in the case, reasoning that errors involving the
use of restraints in these situations are unlikely to be harmless.2 27 These
cases are useful in analyzing the issue of prejudice in immigration cases,
where dangerousness and credibility commonly play critical roles.
In Lemons, the excessive force case discussed above, the Seventh
Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that any error regarding the use of
restraints was harmless, because "[t]he use of handcuffs and leg irons
suggested to the jury that the plaintiff was dangerous and violent, so that
whatever force the guards had used was probably necessary, and not
excessive."228 Similarly, in Tyars, an involuntary commitment case, the
Ninth Circuit opined that
[t]he likelihood of prejudice inherent in exhibiting the
subject of a civil commitment hearing to the jury while
bound in physical restraints, when the critical question the
jury must decide is whether the individual is dangerous to
himself or others, is simply too great to be countenanced
without at least some prior showing of necessity.229

225

See De Abadia-Peixoto v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 277 F.R.D. 572, 575 (N.D. Cal.
2011) ("The premise that a due process violation is not grounds for reversal absent a showing of
that degree of prejudice has no bearing on a plaintiffs right to seek to enjoin due process
violations from occurring in the first instance.") (emphasis in original); Reid v. Donelan, 2 F.
Supp. 3d 38, 44 (D. Mass. 2014).
226
See Davidson v. Riley, 44 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (2d Cir. 1995).
227
See id. at 1125.
228Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d
926, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that the trial court's error in failing to conceal a pretrial

detainee's shackles in an excessive force case was not harmless).
229Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1285 (9th Cir. 1983) (remanding for the district court to
address the issue of prejudice, which is analogous to harmless error). By contrast, in Woods v.
Thieret, where the § 1983 action focused on living conditions in a prison, the Ninth Circuit found
any err or to be harmless because the central issue was unrelated to the presence of physical
restraints. 5 F.3d 244, 249; see also Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1124-25.
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In the immigration context, dangerousness is always a critical issue in
bond hearings and is also often relevant to merits hearings. 23 0 Bond
hearings require the judge to address two key questions: whether the
noncitizen is a flight risk and whether he or she is a danger to the
community. 2 3 1 Appearing in restraints at a bond hearing is therefore
analogous to appearing in restraints at a civil rights trial about excessive
force, where the dangerousness of the plaintiff-prisoner is the main issue.
Dangerousness is also relevant to merits hearings, since some forms of
relief require showing good moral character, while others are discretionary
and unlikely to be granted if the judge thinks the individual poses a threat to
safety. In addition, dangerousness is relevant to determining the
applicability of certain bars to relief. For example, noncitizens are barred
from applying for asylum and withholding of removal if they have been
convicted of a "particularly serious crime," which is a term of art that
requires the judge to consider four factors, including "whether the type and
circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the
community."232

Restraints can also have a profound effect on cases that hinge on
credibility assessments.233 In Davidson, which involved a civil rights action
against prison officials for violating the right of access to courts by reading
legal mail, the Second Circuit reasoned that although the plaintiffs claim
did not "b[ear] a relationship to either a propensity toward violence or a risk
of escape, the potential for prejudice nonetheless seem[ed] to have been
significant, for the verdict apparently was to turn on whether the jury would
believe Davidson and his prisoner-witnesses or the [Department of
Corrections'] witnesses."2 34 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, restraints
increase anxiety, which may impact demeanor on the stand and therefore
affect assessments of the testimony.23 5

230

See supra Part IV.B.

2 1

See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2012).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2012); In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA

232

1982).
233
234

See Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1126.
Id. Some courts have, however, found harmless error even when credibility was at the

heart of the case. See Sides v. Cherry, 609 F.3d 576, 584 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the error
was harmless because the trial court had given a cautionary jury instruction at the beginning of the
trial, but not ruling out the possibility that credibility issues could lead to a different result in other
cases).
235
See Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 2003).
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In removal proceedings, credibility is often a crucial issue. Establishing
credibility is especially important in applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. 236 In these
cases, the main evidence is usually the respondent's own testimony about
any past harm and his or her fear of future harm. Under the REAL ID Act,
immigration judges may consider a wide range of evidence in determining
whether an applicant is credible, including all aspects of demeanor.237 Thus,
the judge may consider "the expression of [the respondent's] countenance,
how he sits or stands, whether he is inordinately nervous, his coloration
during critical examination, the modulation or pace of his speech and other
non-verbal communication., 2 3 8 Being restrained impacts many of these
aspects of demeanor and may therefore influence a crucial credibility
determination. 23 9
Since assessments of dangerousness and credibility both play a major
role in removal proceedings, in many cases it should not be difficult to
establish prejudice as a result of being restrained without an individualized
judicial determination of necessity. In cases that do not raise these issues,
however, the task of demonstrating prejudice becomes much harder, since
the ways that restraints affect a case often remain invisible. The Supreme
Court has recognized that some types of errors should be presumed
prejudicial because a defendant "cannot make a specific showing of
prejudice." 2 40 This could be due to the difficulty in measuring the effects of
an error or because the error undermined the structural integrity of the

236

See Scott Rempell, Credibility Assessments and the REAL ID Act's Amendments, 44 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 185 (2008); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL
ID Act is a FalsePromise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 129 (2006); Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the
Eye of the Beholder? Objective CredibilityAssessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 368 (2003).
2 37
REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4)(C), 1 158(b)(1) (2012).
238
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mendoza Manimbao v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 2003)).
239
See Gonzalez, 341 F.3d at 901 (discussing the impact of restraints on demeanor).
24 0

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993). For examples of cases where the Court
has presumed prejudice, see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986) (involving racial
discrimination in the selection of a grand jury); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)
(involving a judge who had a financial interest in a criminal conviction); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 541-44 (1965) (involving pretrial publicity); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702-04
(1975) (involving the improper shifting of the burden of proof); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
389 (1964) (no judicial determination of the voluntariness of a confession).
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proceeding. 24 1Both of these rationales are applicable to errors involving the
use of restraints.242 As explained in Part V below, restraints can influence
the behavior of the respondent and the judge through subtle psychological
processes, making it hard to measure or demonstrate their impact in a
particular case. Establishing a presumption of prejudice that would shift the
burden to the government to demonstrate harmless error would therefore be
an appropriate framework in these cases.
V. COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL IMPACT OF RESTRAINTS

A. Impact on RestrainedIndividuals
While Courts have long observed that restraints interfere with an
individual's mental faculties and therefore impede his or her ability to
participate in the proceedings, usually no evidence is cited to support such
assertions. A growing body of research in the field of embodied cognition
helps explain why restraints would have this affect and suggests that the
impact may be even more profound than courts have imagined. Theories of
embodied cognition contend that cognitive representations are based in the
brain's sensory systems, so bodily states influence our mental processes.24 3
Researchers have also recently coined the term "enclothed cognition" to
describe the effect of clothing on the thoughts and behavior of the person
who wears it.244 Studies of both embodied and enclothed cognition are
relevant to understanding the psychological and behavioral impact of
restraints, which are worn on the body and physically constrain it.

241 Olano, 507 U.S. at 743 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986)).
242
Holbrooke v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567, 570 (1986) (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.
478, 485 (1978)).
243
See Adam Benforado, The Body of the Mind: Embodied Cognition, Law, and Justice, 54
ST. LOUis U. L.J. 1185, 1190 (2010); Barbara A. Spellman & Simone Schnall, Embodied
Rationality, 35 QUEEN'S L.J. 117, 117 (2009) (arguing that the concept of embodied cognition can
enhance our understanding of decisions involving risk and time, decisions about oneself, and
judgments about others).
2
"See Hajo Adam & Adam D. Galinsky, Enclothed Cognition, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc.

PSYCHOL. 918, 918-19 (2012).
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1. Embodied Cognition
Research in embodied cognition indicates that our bodily states forge
and shape our thoughts, feelings, memories, and judgments. 24 5 For example,
studies show that the physical experience of cleaning oneself influences
judgments of morality; 24 6 experiencing physical warmth increases feeling of
interpersonal warmth; 24 7 walking slowly activates stereotypes of the
elderly; 248 nodding one's head while listening to a persuasive message
increases susceptibility to persuasion;249 carrying a heavy clipboard
increases judgments of importance; 250 smelling clean scents increases the
tendency to reciprocate trust and offer charitable help; 25 1 and firming one's
muscles helps increase willpower.252
Since restraints constrain the body, the most relevant studies for
understanding their impact pertain to body posture. Scientists who study
animal behavior have long known that there is a strong relationship between
body expansiveness and power-related behavior, suggesting that the two are
253
Across species, animals that are big or that make
evolutionarily linked.
themselves look big act powerful.25 4 Body posture has a similar effect on

245

Benforado, supra note 243, at 1190.
Chen-Bo Zhong & Katie Liljenquist, Washing Away Your Sins: Threatened Morality and
Physical Cleansing, 313 SCI. 1451, 1452 (2006); Simone Schnall et al., With a Clean Conscience:
Cleanliness Reduces the Severity ofMoral Judgments, 19 PSYCHOL. SC. 1219, 1221 (2008).
246

247Lawrence E. Williams & John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes
Interpersonal Warmth, 322 SCI. 606, 607 (2008).
248 Thomas Mussweiler, Doing Is for Thinking! Stereotype Activation
by Stereotypic

Movements, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 17, 20 (2006).
249
Gary L. Wells & Richard E. Petty, The Effects of Overt Head Movements on Persuasion:
Compatibility and Incompatibility of Responses, 1 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 228
(1980).
250
Nils B. Jostmann et al., Weight as an Embodiment ofImportance, 20 PSYCHOL. SCl. 1169,
1173 (2009).
251 Katie Liljenquist et al., The Smell of Virtue: Clean Scents Promote Reciprocity and
Charity, 21 PSYCHOL. SC. 381, 382 (2010).
252 Iris W. Hung & Apama A. Labroo, From Firm Muscles to Firm Willpower:
Understanding the Role of Embodied Cognition in Self-Regulation, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 1046,
1058 (2011).
253
Li Huang et al., Powerful Postures Versus Powerful Roles: Which Is the Proximate
Correlateof Thought andBehavior?, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 95, 96 (2011).
254 See, e.g., STEVE L. ELLYSON & JOHN F. DOVIDIO, Power, Dominance, and Nonverbal
Behavior: Basic Concepts and Issues, in POWER, DOMINANCE, AND NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR I

(Steve L. Ellyson & John F. Dovidio eds., 1985); Judith A. Hall et al., Nonverbal Behavior and
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humans.25 SOne study found that individuals who were posed into expansive
postures reported feeling more powerful, chose riskier gambles, and
experienced higher levels of testosterone and lower levels of cortisol
compared with participants in constricted body postures.256 Another study
found that individuals placed in constricted postures developed a sense of
learned helplessness more quickly than individuals in expansive postures.257
In fact, some researchers contend that body posture has a direct impact on
behavior, similar to physical sensations such as pain.25 8 The physical
sensations send messages to the parts of the brain called the thalamus and
amygdala along a neural pathway that has very few synapses and therefore
results in a rapid transmission from sensation to behavior.259
A 2010 study by Li Huang and his colleagues was the first to show that
body posture affects abstract thinking as well as behavior, and that the
impact of posture is even stronger than actually having a powerful role.260
In this study, the researchers manipulated role power by randomly assigning
participants the role of manager or subordinate.26 1 Managers were told that
they would direct, evaluate, and reward the subordinates in a two-person
puzzle task.262 Subordinates were told that they would follow the managers'
direction, build the puzzle, and be evaluated by the managers.263 The
researchers also manipulated embodied power by placing participants in
expansive or constricted postures.264 The expansive posture involved sitting
with one arm on the armrest of a chair and the other arm on the back of a
nearby chair, with the ankle of one leg resting on the thigh of the other leg
and stretched beyond the edge of the chair.2 65 The constricted posture
the Vertical Dimension of Social Relations: A Meta-Analysis, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 898, 898
(2005); FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: SEX AND POWER AMONG APES 86 (1982).
255

See Dana R. Carney et al., PowerPosing: BriefNonverbalDisplays Affect Neuroendocrine
Levels and Risk Tolerance, 21 PSYCHOL. SC. 1363, 1366 (2010).
25 6

id

257John H. Riskind & Carolyn C. Gotay, Physical Posture: Could It Have Regulatory or

FeedbackEffects on Motivation andEmotion?, 6 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 273, 293 (1982).
258
See Huang et al., supra note 253, at 96-97.
259

Id.

at 97

(citing JOSEPH LEDOUX,

THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN:

UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 163-66 (Simon & Schuster ed. 1996)).
260
d. at 96-97.
26
Id at 97.
262
263
26

id
id

4id

2651d
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involved sitting with hands placed under the thighs, dropped shoulders, and
legs together.266 After receiving their roles and being seated in one of the
postures, but before doing the puzzle, the participants engaged in a
decision-making task and an abstraction task.267
The decision-making task involved a simulated blackjack game that
required participants to decide whether they wanted to take a card.268 The
abstraction task involved identifying pictures in a series of fragmented
images. 269 In the blackjack game, participants seated in the expansive
posture took a card more often than those in the constricted posture.2 70 By
contrast, neither role nor the interaction between role and posture had a
statistically significant effect.2 71 On the abstract thinking task, participants
in the expansive posture correctly identified more pictures than participants
in the constricted posture.272 Again, neither the effect of role nor the
interaction between role and posture was statistically significant.2 73
Participants in the expansive posture also reported having a greater sense of
power than those in the constrictive posture during both of these tasks.274 A
separate experiment that was part of the same study similarly found that
participants seated in the expansive posture took action more often than
those in the constricted posture in three scenarios: deciding to speak first in
a debate, leaving the site of a plane crash to find help, and joining a
movement to free someone who was wrongly imprisoned. 27 5 The
researchers concluded that the body has an intimate connection to important
psychological processes and is the most direct correlate of power-related
behavior, mattering more than actually having a powerful role.276
This study provides relevant guidance for understanding the impact of
restraints on respondents in removal proceedings and other types of cases.
The types of restraints commonly used for courtroom security-handcuffs,
leg irons, and belly chains--constrain the human body much more than the
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constrictive posture in the experiment and therefore may have an even
greater impact on cognition and behavior. In the immigration context,
restraints may make the respondent less likely to request relief, which, like
asking for a card in the blackjack game, represents a gamble. Instead, the
detainee may remain passive and take voluntary departure or a removal
order. Restraints may also affect other critical decisions, such as whether or
not to admit the factual allegations, concede the charge of removability, and
file an appeal. Furthermore, like piecing together images into a picture,
immigration cases involve gathering and analyzing evidence and telling a
coherent story. Understanding complex immigration laws and applying
them to a particular case also requires abstract thinking skills. Since
constrictive body posture interferes with such abstract thinking, restraints
may have a profound effect on a respondent's ability to present his or her
case, especially if he or she is unrepresented. These cognitive and
behavioral effects of restraints underscore that the respondent's interest in
participating in the hearing is at stake, which is relevant to the first factor of
the Mathews test. In addition, these studies highlight how the indiscriminate
use of restraints contributes to the risk of error. If restraints impede the
respondent's motivation or ability to fight the case, then there is an
increased risk that the judge will issue a deportation order against someone
who has a valid basis for remaining in the United States.
2. Enclothed Cognition
Studies about the impact of clothing on cognitive processes similarly
provide a framework for understanding the impact of restraints. Most
people intuitively know that what you wear affects how others perceive
you. Numerous studies confirm this, showing, for example, that women
who dress in a masculine fashion during job interviews are more likely to
be hired;2 77 students perceive teaching assistants who wear formal attire as
more intelligent than those who dress casually; 278 and defendants dressed in
black are perceived as more dangerous than those wearing light clothes. 27 9

Sandra M. Forsythe, Effect ofApplicant's Clothing on Interviewer'sDecisionto Hire, 20 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1579, 1585, 1588 (1990).
278 Tracy L. Morris et al., Fashion in the Classroom: Effects of Attire on Student
Perceptions
ofInstructors in College Classes, 45 CoMM. EDUC. 135, 143 (1996).
279
Aldert Vrij, Wearing Black Clothes: The Impact of Offenders' and Suspects' Clothing on
Impression Formation, 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 47, 52 (1997).
277
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These studies provide relevant background for understanding the effect that
seeing a defendant in restraints may have on a jury or judge.
What is equally important, however, is that clothing also has profound
psychological and behavioral effects on the person who wears it. For
example, studies have shown that wearing hoods and capes makes people
more likely to administer electric shocks to others, whereas wearing a
nurse's uniform makes people less likely to do so; 2 80 wearing a bikini
makes women feel ashamed, eat less, and perform worse at math;28 1 and
professional sports teams that wear black uniforms are more aggressive
than teams that wear other colors.282 A recent study coined the term
"enclothed cognition" to describe this phenomenon.283 This study, which
was profiled in The New York Times, found that participants who wore a
white lab coat, believing that it belonged to a doctor, demonstrated
significant improvement in their ability to pay attention.284 Participants who
believed that the coat belonged to a painter, on the other hand, showed no
such improvement.285 The authors theorized that wearing a piece of clothing
influences psychological processes by triggering associated abstract
concepts through the clothing's symbolic meaning.286 Thus, both the
physical experience of wearing the clothing-seeing it on one's body,
feeling it on one's skin-and knowing its symbolic meaning are critical to
287
enclothed cognition.
Restraints both create physical sensations and are imbued with symbolic
meaning. Physically, respondents can see and feel the restraints around their

280Phillip G. Zimbardo,

The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order versus

Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, 17 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 237, 264, 268 (1969);

Robert D. Johnson & Leslie L. Downing, Deindividuation and Valence of Cues: Effects on
Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 1532, 1534, 1536
(1979).
281 Barbara L. Fredrickson et al., That Swimsuit Becomes You: Sex Differences in SelfObjectification, RestrainedEating, and Math Performance, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
269, 275, 279-80 (1998).
282 Mark G. Frank & Thomas Gilovich, The Dark Side of Self- and Social Perception: Black
Uniforms and Aggression in Professional Sports, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 74, 81
(1988).
283 Adam & Galinsky, supra note 244, at
919.
284Id at 922; Sandra Blakeslee, Mind Games: Sometimes a White Coat Isn't Just a White
Coat, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2012, at D3.
285 Adam & Galinsky, supra note 244, at 921.
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hands, legs, and waists. They can also hear the clinking of the chains
whenever they move, especially when they are led into the courtroom and
when they approach the counsel table for their hearings. Symbolically, the
types of metal chains used as restraints represent criminality, oppression,
submission, and powerlessness. Chains are also associated with slavery,
which involved egregious forms of oppression and dehumanization.
Respondents in removal proceedings are certainly aware that chains
represent powerlessness while physically seeing, feeling, and hearing the
chains on their bodies. The study of enclothed cognition discussed above
indicates that this combination may well influence a respondent's mental
processes and generate feelings of helplessness and corresponding
behaviors, especially when worn with an orange jumpsuit, which is another
symbol of criminality. As noted above, in removal proceedings such
helplessness may manifest as accepting deportation without exploring
possible forms of relief, not making the effort to gather supporting
documents for an application, or not working actively with counsel to
ensure that all the relevant facts are introduced into evidence.28 8
3. Impact of Restraints in Other Contexts
The argument that the use of restraints in the courtroom has serious
cognitive and behavioral impacts is also supported by studies on the effects
of restraints in other contexts, such as in nursing homes and psychiatric
hospitals, as well as studies examining acute restraint stress in experiments
conducted with mice and rats. In nursing homes, common examples of
restraints include chairs that prevent rising, belts or vests that secure an
individual to a chair or bed, and devices that prevent moving an arm, leg,
foot, or hand.289 Physical restraints in this context are used primarily for
individuals who are at risk of falling, have motor unrest and agitated
behavior, or manifest an intention to harm themselves.2 90 Studies have
shown that restrained residents in nursing homes are more likely to
experience cognitive declines, decreased self-esteem and social
engagement, increased confusion and forgetfulness, depression,

288See,

e.g., United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 106 (Cardamone, J., concurring).

289

Nicholas G. Castle, Mental Health Outcomes and Physical Restraint Use in Nursing

Homes, 33 ADMIN. & POL'Y MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES RES. 696, 696-97

(2006).
290

Andrea M. Berzlanovich et al., Deaths Due to Physical Restraint, 109 DEUTSCHES
ARZTEBLATT INT. 27, 27 (2012).
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humiliation, fear, anger, agitation, anxiety, and resistance to care.
Similarly, in psychiatric settings, the negative emotions related to the use of
restraints commonly reported by patients include "anger, helplessness,
powerlessness, confusion, loneliness, desolation, and humiliation."2 92
The use of restraints is particularly damaging for individuals who have
experienced past trauma. Women with histories of childhood sexual abuse,
for example, recalled the experience of being physically restrained in a
hospital as representing a reenactment of their original trauma and reported
traumatic emotional reactions, such as fear, rage, and anxiety.2929 Professor
Elyn Saks and others have advocated allowing psychiatric patients choice
among various restraint measures because they "are most likely to know
their own states of mind and how various measures will affect them." 2 94
Many detainees in removal proceedings have also experienced severe
trauma, which is often the basis of applications for asylum and related
forms of relief. For these individuals, restraints may have a particularly
detrimental effect on their ability to participate fully in the proceedings.
Finally, studies of acute restraint stress-a widely used experimental
model to study emotional and autonomic responses to stress in animalsshed even more light on the impact of restraints.295 The procedure usually

29 1

See Castle, supra note 289, at 700-01; Eliana S. Chaves et al., Review of the Use of
Physical Restraints and Lap Belts With Wheelchair Users, 19 ASSISTIVE TECH. 94, 99 (2007);
Lorraine C. Mion et al., Effect of Situational and Clinical Variables on the Likelihood of
Physicians Ordering Physical Restraints, 58 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'Y 1279, 1287 (2010); Sarah
Mott et al., Physical and Chemical Restraints in Acute Care: Their Potential Impact on the
Rehabilitation of Older People, 11 INT'L J. NURSING PRAC. 95, 98 (2005).
292
Raija Kontio et al., Seclusion and Restraint in Psychiatry: Patients' Experiences and
Practical Suggestions on How to Improve Practices and Use Alternatives, 48 PERSP.
PSYCHIATRIC CARE 16, 17 (2012) (citing T. Hoekstra et al., Seclusion: The Inside Story, 11 J.
PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 276, 277 (2004)); see also Sharon R. Aschen,

Restraints: Does Position Make a Difference?, 16 ISSUES MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 87, 90
(1995) (stating that the feeling of powerlessness was a "main objection" to the use of restraints).
293 Ruth Gallop et al., The Experience ofHospitalizationandRestraint of Women Who Have a
History of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 20 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT'L 401, 407-08, 413
(1999).
294
Elyn R. Saks, The Use of Mechanical Restraints in PsychiatricHospitals, 95 YALE L.J.
1836, 1853 (1986); see also Zoe Sussman, Note, Mechanical Restraints: Is This Your Idea of
Therapy?, 21 S. CAL. REv. L. & SOC. JUST. 109, 124 (2011).
295
See Cristiane Busnardo et al., ParaventricularNucleus Modulates Autonomic and
NeuroendocrineResponses to Acute Restraint Stress in Rats, 158 AUTONOMIC NEUROSCIENCE:
BASIC & CLINICAL 51, 51, 55 (2010).
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involves placing a mouse or rat in a container that restricts its movement.296
This stress model leads to autonomic, behavioral, cognitive, and
neurological changes.297 The autonomic changes include hormonal changes,
elevated blood pressure, elevated heart rate, and increased body
temperature.29 8 Behavioral changes include reduced exploration of the open
arms of a maze,2 99 reduced exploratory activity in an open field,oo increased
immobility in a forced swimming test,3 01 and enhanced fear conditioning.302
Cognitive and neurological changes include anxiety, depression, fear,
impaired memory, and dendritic atrophy.303 If humans experience the same
types of biological changes when physically restrained, those changes
would have a significant impact on the ability to fight a deportation case.

296

See, e.g., id at 52.

297 See, e.g., id. at
56.

298 See, e.g., id at 51, 55 (discussing hormonal changes); Rodrigo F. Tavares & Fernando M.
Corr6a, Role of the Medial PrefrontalCortex in CardiovascularResponses to Acute Restraint in
Rats, 143 NEUROSCIENCE 231, 238 (2006) (describing changes in heart rate); Takao Kubo et al.,
The Lateral Septal Area is Involved in Mediation of Immobilization Stress-Induced Blood
Pressure Increase in Rats, 318 NEUROSCIENCE LETTERS 25, 26 (2002) (describing changes in
blood pressure); Daniel M. L. Vianna & Pascal Carrive, Changes in Cutaneous and Body
Temperature During and After ConditionedFearto Context in the Rat, 21 EUR. J NEUROSCIENCE
2505, 2510 (2005) (describing changes in body temperature).
299 Claudia M. Padovan et al., Behavioral Effects in the Elevated Plus Maze of an NMDA
Antagonist Injected into the Dorsal Hippocampus: Influence of Restraint Stress, 67
PHARMACOLOGY BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 325, 328 (2000); F.S. Guimaries et al., Hippocampal
5-HT Receptors and Consolidation of Stressful Memories, 58 BEHAV. BRAIN RES. 133, 136
(1993).
3
0Guy A. Kennett et al., Enhancement of Some 5-HT-Dependent Behavioural Responses
Following Repeated Immobilization in Rats, 330 BRAIN RES. 253, 259 (1985); G.A. Kennett et al.,
Antidepressant-Like Action of 5-HTIA Agonists and Conventional Antidepressants in an Animal
Model ofDepression, 134 EUR. J. PHARMACOLOGY 265, 268 (1987); S. Mechiel Korte & Sietse F.
De Boer, A Robust Animal Model of State Anxiety: Fear-PotentiatedBehaviour in the Elevated
Plus-Maze, 463 EUR. J. PHARMACOLOGY 163, 163 (2003).
301
See S. Sevgi et al., L-NAME Prevents Anxiety-Like and Depression-Like Behavior in Rats
Exposed to Restraint Stress,
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Cheryl D. Conrad et al., Repeated Restraint Stress Facilitates Fear Conditioning
Independently of Causing Hippocampal CA3 Dendritic Atrophy, 113 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE
902, 906 (1999).
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See id. at 902-03; see also Guimaries et al., supra note 299, at 134; Sevgi et al., supra
note 301, at 97.
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4. Conclusions Regarding the Impact of Restraints on Litigants
While the impact of restraints in a courtroom will obviously depend on
the type of restraints used and their duration, the common themes that
emerge across various contexts is that restraints affect both thoughts and
behavior, generally resulting in feelings of powerlessness, impairing
cognition, and impeding action. Such changes would diminish a detainee's
sense of dignity in removal proceedings and prevent full participation in the
proceedings, which, as discussed above, are important liberty interests
under the first factor of the Mathews test. In addition, the psychological and
behavioral changes triggered by restraints increase the risk of error by
enervating one side in the adversarial process and making it difficult for that
party to provide critical information in analyzing deportability and
eligibility for relief from removal.
B. Impact on Judges
While courts have readily accepted the idea that restraints prejudice the
jury, they tend to assume that judges are immune to such bias, often without
explaining why.304 This assumption could be based on various factors. First,
judges are legally trained and have professional experience in making
decisions, which distinguishes them from laypeople.30 5 Judges may even be
more intelligent, on average, than laypeople.306 Judges also have repeated
exposure to similar types of decision-making tasks, which may improve
their performance, at least where there is some type of feedback in the form
of appellate review.30 7 Furthermore, judges, unlike jurors, usually need to
state the rationale for their decisions, which requires deliberative
thinking.308 Lastly, judges are held individually accountable for their
decisions, whereas jurors are not.309

3

0See, e.g., United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2007).
305
See Blinking on the Bench, supra note 157, at 13.
306

See id.
See Erica Beecher-Monas, Heuristics, Biases, and the Importance of Gatekeeping, 2003
MICH. ST. L. REv. 987, 1002 (2003); Christopher Jepson et al., Inductive Reasoning: Competence
or Skill?, 6 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 494, 498 (1983) (discussing studies indicating that training in
reasoning improves performance).
308
Blinking on the Bench, supra note 157, at 36-38.
309 Beecher-Monas, supra note 307, at 1002.
307
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Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies examining the impact of
restraints on either juries or judges to test whether the assumptions made
about either group are true. Judge Posner has therefore critiqued "[t]he
speculative nature of the inquiry into prejudice" in these types of cases.31 o
Although this article does not supply the missing empirical evidence on the
impact of restraints, it draws on various studies of judicial behavior to
theorize why the sight of shackles is likely to have a prejudicial impact on
the judge. The article contends that even though judges may be less
prejudiced than jurors, any amount of prejudice is relevant to the procedural
due process analysis. Furthermore, immigration judges are particularly
susceptible to being prejudiced by the sight of restraints given the
conditions and manner in which they must render decisions, as discussed
above.
1. Overconfidence
Courts that assume judges are not prejudiced by the sight of a shackled
litigant may be demonstrating overconfidence in judicial objectivity. Such
overconfidence, which is also a heuristic known as "egocentric bias," has
been studied among real judges.3 1' Professor Theodore Eisenberg, for
example, found that bankruptcy judges were overconfident about how fairly
they treat the attorneys who appear before them.312 Jeffrey Rachlinski, Chris
Guthrie, and Andrew Wistrich also found evidence of overconfidence
among the judiciary. One of their studies showed that federal magistrate

&

31oStephenson v. Wilson, 619 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2010) ("There are rigorous empirical
studies of jury behavior.... But no studies that the parties have cited or that we have found
address the impact of visible restraints on jury deliberations.") (citations omitted). The opinion
cites the following empirical studies of jury behavior: Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of
Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury Decision Making, 32 LAW & HUMAN
BEHAV. 137 (2007); Dennis J. Devine et al., Deliberation Quality: A PreliminaryExamination in
Criminal Juries, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 273 (2007); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury
Agreement in CriminalCases: A PartialReplication ofKalven and Zeisel's The American Jury, 2
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in
CapitalCases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538 (1998); Theodore Eisenberg
Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: JurorInstructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1
(1993); see also Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Social science has
challenged many premises of the jury system.").
"'Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 813 (2001)
[hereinafter JudicialMind].
312 Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72
WASH. U. L. REv. 979, 985 (1994).
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judges exhibited strong egocentric bias regarding the likelihood of being
overturned on appeal.313 Another study found that administrative law judges
displayed overconfidence in their ability to avoid racial prejudice in
decision-making relative to other judges; 97% of the judges placed
themselves in the top half and 50% placed themselves in the top quartile,
while not a single judge placed herself in the bottom quartile.3 14 These
studies demonstrate that judges tend to overestimate the fairness and
accuracy of their decisions, which suggests good reason to be cautious
about relying on judges' own estimations of their ability to remain impartial
at the sight of a shackled litigant."s
Assuming that the sight of restraints does not prejudice a judge risks not
only ignoring existing biases but also exacerbating them. Believing oneself
to be objective makes one more susceptible to act on implicit biases.' 16 For
example, one experiment found that individuals primed to think of
themselves as objective evaluated male job candidates higher than female
candidates, whereas a control group that was not primed in this manner
treated them the same.317 Doubting one's own objectivity therefore
represents the first step towards breaking the link between implicit bias and
behavior. 3 18 Doubt also increases motivation to be fair. 31 9 Trainings with the
judiciary on implicit bias educate judges about unconscious forms of
prejudice to instill doubt in objectivity and increase motivation to be fair.320
After going through such trainings, judges are more likely to report that
implicit biases can affect their behavior.3 2 1

3 JudicialMind, supra note 311, at 814.
314
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195, 1225-26 (2009) [hereinafter Unconscious Racial Bias]; see also
Chris Guthrie et al., The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch
Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519 (2009).
315 UnconsciousRacial Bias, supra note 314, at 1226.
316
See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, "IThink It, Therefore It's True": Effects of
Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 207, 210-11 (2007).
31Id.
3 18

See Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 157, at 1172-73.
"Id. at 1174-75.
32 0
See id. at 1172-75.
32 1
1d at 1175; see also Pamela M. Casey et al., Nat'1 Ctr. for State Courts, Helping Courts
Address Implicit Bias: Resources for Education 12 fig.3, 22 tbl.11 (2012), available at
3

http://www.ncsc.org/IBReport (finding that 90% of the judges in California and 97% of the judges
in North Dakota reported they would apply the training to their work).
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2. The Representativeness Heuristic
The representative heuristic refers to how people tend to base their
judgment about whether someone fits into a given category on the degree to
which that person is representative of the category.322 This leads people to
place too much weight on whether the evidence matches their mental
picture of a particular category.323 In other words, people tend to "reason by
anecdote and stereotype rather than through the use of group-based
knowledge." 32 4 Legal scholars have long recognized that the
representativeness heuristic may lead judges and juries to convict certain
defendants and acquit others. 325 For example, Russell Korobkin and
Thomas Ulen argued that "[u]sing the representativeness heuristic, many
jurors are likely to conclude that because the defendant has the appearance
of a criminal (in that he has a felony conviction), he therefore must have
committed the crime for which he is charged." 32 6 Conversely, Gregory
322

See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics andBiases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?,
79 OR. L. REv. 61, 82 (2000); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by
Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84-87, 98

(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds. 1982) (explaining that, due to the
representativeness heuristic, a jury may fail to understand that the event, "the defendant left the
scene of the crime," must be more likely than the event, "the defendant left the scene of the crime
for fear of being accused of murder").
323 Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57
STAN. L. REV. 291, 295 (2004); see also Nancy Leong, Improving Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 377,
406 (2014) (arguing that since Fourth Amendment violations are rarely alleged in § 1983 lawsuits
for money damages, but commonly alleged in criminal proceedings, "the prevailing prototypical
individual criminal defendant-one not entitled to exclusion as a remedy-will trump even
relatively uncontroversial background data in judges' minds").
324
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REv. 363, 403 (1999).
325
See, e.g., Victor J. Gold, FederalRule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of
Unfairly PrejudicialEvidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 528-29 (1983) (explaining that a trier of
fact may improperly employ the representativeness heuristic in finding that a defendant's
economic, social, ethnic and racial background, along with past criminal acts, fit the stereotype of
a criminal); Elizabeth Kessler, Patternof Sexual Conduct Evidence and Present Consent: Limiting
the Admissibility ofSexual History Evidence in Rape Prosecutions, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 79,
93-95 (1992) (arguing that the representativeness heuristic will lead juries to overreact to
evidence of a rape victim's sexual history, thereby justifying suppression of it); Slobogin, supra
note 324, at 403-04 (arguing that the representativeness heuristic makes it difficult for finders of
fact to "maintain allegiance to high-minded constitutional values" during criminal trials).
326
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
RationalityAssumptions from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1051, 1087 (2000); see also
James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Non-Matches as Evidence of
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Mitchell observes, "when considering whether to convict a small, elderly
woman accused of committing a violent crime, a juror might intuitively
compare this woman to the juror's image of a violent criminal and resist
inculpatory evidence because the defendant is not representative of this
category." 3 27

Physical appearance, mannerisms, personal history, and economic,
social, and racial background may all be taken as evidence of guilt when
consistent with stereotypes of guilty people, or they may be taken as
evidence of innocence when consistent with stereotypes of innocent
people.32 8 In fact, studies have shown that juries are more lenient toward an
attractive defendant than an unattractive one, which reflects the notion that
beauty is representative of innocence and ugliness is representative of
evil.329 Since restraints are representative of danger and criminality, the
sight of a restrained litigant may well lead to inferences of guilt. The
question then becomes whether judges, like laypersons, are vulnerable to
the representativeness heuristic.
A 2001 study by Professors Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich
conducted with 167 federal magistrate judges found that the judges did, in
fact, exhibit representativeness bias, along with several other heuristic
biases.330 Only 40% of the judges in the study chose the correct answer on a
Innocence, 98 IOWA L. REv. 577, 665-66 (2013) (explaining that, due to the representativeness
heuristic, a "defendant's prior record and the scenario itself cast the defendant as someone who
resembles a criminal, obscuring the base rate of other possible suspects").
327 Gregory Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065, 1069-71 (2003).
32

8See Gold, supra note 325, at 528-29; Kessler, supra note 325, at 94; Judicial Mind, supra
note 311, at 805 (describing how the representativeness heuristic leads people to take a
defendant's nervous and shifty behavior as evidence of guilt whereas the appearance of ease is
taken as evidence of innocence).
329
See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
DeliberatingGroups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 679 (2001) (citing mock jury studies by
Richard R. Izzet & Walter Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of Defendant
Characteristicsin a Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 271, 276-77 (1974)); Norbert L.
Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: ComparingIndividuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 687, 714
(1996).
330 Judicial Mind, supra note 311, at 793-94, 797-98, 803-04, 810 (finding evidence of
anchoring, framing, representativeness, and hindsight bias among the judges); see also Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1256-57 (2006)
(finding, based on a study involving 113 bankruptcy judges, that these specialists were susceptible
to anchoring and framing biases and that more experienced judges performed no better than less
experienced ones, indicating that more time on the bench does not protect against psychological
influences).
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task designed to test for representativeness bias, and the vast majority of
those who got it wrong picked the answer that would be reached by relying
on intuitive thinking. 33 ' However, despite the large number of errors made
by the judges, they still performed much better at the task than other types
of experts.332 For example, a similar experiment conducted with doctors
found that only 18% of the doctors selected the correct answer.333 These
results indicate that legal training or experience on the bench may well give
judges an advantage in counteracting the representativeness bias. A study
finding that graduate training in law reduces the likelihood of committing
the representativeness heuristic further supports this theory.334 Overall,
these studies suggest that judges are susceptible to being biased by the sight
of shackles, but the prejudicial effect may be less than on jurors.
3. Intuitive vs. Deliberative Thinking
In a separate study that explored how judges think and make decisions,
Professors Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich gave over two hundred trial
judges a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).335 The CRT involves just three
questions designed to distinguish intuitive from deliberative processing. 33 6

While the test measures some component of intelligence, it more
specifically measures "the capability and willingness to deliberate to solve a
problem when [relying on] intuition would lead one astray."337 The authors
were interested in examining whether "judges' education, intelligence, and
on-the-job training as professional decision makers might distinguish them
from most of the rest of the population."338 The results showed that the
judges used a predominantly intuitive approach. 33 9 Their average score on
33
JudicialMind,
332

supra note 311, at 810.

Id at 818.

3 Id (citing Ward Casscells et al., Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory
Results, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 999, 999-1000 (1978) (finding that 18% of doctors facing a
nearly identical problem in the medical context answered correctly)).
334
See Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal
Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 440 (1988)
(finding that graduate training in law reduces the likelihood of committing the inverse fallacy,
which is a form of the representativeness heuristic).
33Blinking on the Bench, supra note 157, at 10, 13, 17.
3
1 Id at 10.
3 7
1d. at 12.
338

Id. at 13.
...
Id at 19.
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the test was slightly higher than the average of students at the University of
Michigan and slightly lower than the average of students at Harvard.340
About one-third of the judges failed to answer any of the questions
correctly, one-third answered just one correctly, less than one-quarter
answered two correctly, and only one-seventh answered all three
correctly.3 41 The incorrect answers that the judges selected tended to be the
intuitive ones. 342 These results again suggest that judges may be more
deliberative than the average layperson, but they still rely frequently on
intuition.
4. Implicit Consideration of Irrelevant Facts
Although restraints normally have no legal relevance to the case, their
presence may unconsciously affect a judge's decision, just as implicit racial
bias has been shown to influence legal outcomes. In one study of implicit
racial bias, trial court judges who had taken the Implicit Association Test
(IAT) were given two different vignettes and asked their views about the
defendant's likelihood of recidivism and the recommended verdict.3 43 The
judges who had a higher degree of implicit bias against Blacks were harsher
on defendants when primed with words designed to trigger the social
category African American, whereas judges who implicitly favored Blacks
were more lenient with defendants after being primed with such words,
suggesting that implicit biases influenced judicial decisions. 344 In general,
however, without taking into account how the judges scored on the IAT, the
primes did not prompt harsher responses from judges. 34 5 This finding was
different from the results of a similar study conducted with laypersons,
which found that such primes prompted harsher responses across the
board.34 6 Specifically, when researchers Sandra Graham and Brian Lowery
subliminally primed police officers and juvenile probation officers with
words such as "Harlem" or "dreadlocks," the officers recommended harsher

340

1Id. at 14.
341Id. at 14-15.
342

Id. at 16.

343 Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 314, at 1214-15.
345

Id. at 1216.

3

Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About
Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 493-94, 496 (2004).
4Id.;
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sentences.347 These studies once again indicate that implicit biases do affect
judicial behavior, but not to the same extent that they affect the behavior of
non-judges.
Judicial susceptibility to implicitly considering irrelevant facts such as
race has also been documented in a number of other contexts, such as bail
determinations and sentencing. One study found that judges were 15% more
likely to require African American defendants to post bail than White
defendants, even though African Americans were less likely to flee before
their court date.348 Similarly, race, gender, income, and education all appear
to influence sentencing decisions. 34 9 Nationality has also been shown to
influence judicial decisions, as U.S. citizen offenders "receive shorter
sentences for most crimes, are less likely to be incarcerated, are more likely
to receive downward departures, and typically receive larger downward
departures than noncitizens."35 0 These studies undercut the notion that
judges are immune from considering legally irrelevant facts.
5. Implicit Consideration of Inadmissible Evidence
Studies examining whether judges can ignore inadmissible evidence are
similarly relevant to the question of whether they are prejudiced by the
sight of a litigant in restraints. Unfortunately, there are few such studies. A
1994 study found that judges were unable to disregard evidence that a tort
defendant had undertaken remedial measures, even when told that a prior
judge had found that evidence inadmissible.35 1 The study further found that
the judges' response to the inadmissible evidence was similar to that of

347

Graham & Lowery, supra note 346, at 489, 493, 496.

348

See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 207 tbl.7.3, 231 tbl.7.6

(1979); see also Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail
Setting, in PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL

EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER

DISCRIMINATION 233, 236-37 (Ian Ayres ed., 2001) (discussing the influence of race on bail
determinations).
349
See, e.g., David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidencefrom the U.S. FederalCourts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 312 (2001) (finding large disparities
in sentences across offense types on the basis of race, gender, education, income, and citizenship,
even after controlling for numerous factors); see also id. at 286-88 n.1-19 (citing other studies
discussing disparities in sentencing).
350
Mustard, supra note 349.
35 1
Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effects of
Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCL. & L.
113, 120-22 (1994).
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jury-eligible adults.352 A more recent study involving 265 judges concluded
that judges often cannot ignore information they know, but they are better
able to do so in some situations than others.353 The researchers gave the
judges seven scenarios that were designed to test the ability to disregard
certain types of inadmissible evidence.354 In five of the scenarios, the judges
had difficulty disregarding the information, whereas in two of the scenarios,
the judges managed to ignore the inadmissible evidence.3 5 The authors
found that these results defied easy explanation, but suggested that judges
may be worse at ignoring inadmissible information when making factual
determinations, which are less likely to be scrutinized on appeal than legal
determinations.356 Thus, in immigration proceedings, where appeals are
rare, judges may be particularly susceptible to unconsciously considering
inadmissible evidence.35
In addition, two studies conducted with non-judges found that the effect
of inadmissible evidence is moderated by race.35 One study tested the
impact of incriminating wiretap evidence on conviction rates of Black and
White defendants in a simulated criminal trial.35 9 When the participants
were told that the wiretap evidence was admissible and could be considered,
there was no difference in conviction rates whether the defendant was
White or Black. 3 60 But when subjects were told the wiretap evidence was
inadmissible and should be disregarded, they were harsher on the Black
defendant than the White defendant. 361 These results indicate that when
35

2Id. at 125.

353 Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of

DeliberatelyDisregarding, 153 U. PA. L.REv. 1251, 1251-52, 1279 (2005).
34
5 Id. at 1282-83.
3ss The judges had difficulty ignoring information disclosed during a settlement conference, a
conversation protected by attorney-client privilege, the prior sexual history of an alleged rape
victim, the prior criminal convictions of a plaintiff, and information on which the government had

promised not to rely at sentencing. Id. at 1291, 1297, 1303, 1307, 1311. However, the judges were
able to ignore a criminal confession obtained in violation of a defendant's right to counsel and the
outcome of a search when determining whether there was probable cause. Id at 1317, 1321.
3 6
s Id. at 1323-24.
357
See supra Part IV.B.l .c. (discussing the special susceptibility of immigration judges).
358

See James D. Johnson et al., Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential RacialEffects of
Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893, 893, 896

(1995).
"Id.

SId.

at 896.
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subjects could justify convicting the Black defendant on nonracial grounds
(i.e., not letting a guilty person go free), they did so, even though the
conviction was based on inadmissible evidence.362 The study also found that
participants reported being less affected by the inadmissible evidence when
the defendant was Black. 6 This finding is consistent with research
showing that people believe they are less influenced by information
consistent with previously held expectations. 364 Since th
the participants may
have expected Black male defendants to be guilty based on stereotypes,
they underestimated the effects that the inadmissible evidence had on their
judgments.365
A British study similarly found that the effects of DNA evidence varied
based on the race of the defendant.366 The study involved White participants
who read a legal scenario involving a Black or White defendant, which
included incriminating DNA evidence that was described as 98.5%
accurate. 3 67 Afterwards, the participants were asked to provide ratings about
guilt, sentencing recommendations, the likelihood that the defendant would
reoffend, and the likelihood of rehabilitation.6 When the participants were
instructed to disregard the DNA evidence because it was inadmissible, they
rated the Black defendant as more guilty than the White defendant,
recommended longer sentences to the Black defendant, and rated the Black
defendant as more likely to re-offend and less likely to be rehabilitated.369
Furthermore, the participants tended to judge Black defendants more
harshly when the incriminating evidence was inadmissible than when it was
admissible. 3 70 The authors proposed that certain thoughts may become more
accessible as an ironic consequence of trying to suppress them, citing prior
research showing that people who are told to suppress stereotypic thoughts

36

1Id. at 897.

363
3

Id.
"Id

365

1d.
Gordon Hodson et al., Adverse Racism in Britain: The Use of Inadmissible Evidence in
Legal Decisions, 35 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 437, 440,444 (2005).
36
1Id. at 440-41.
3 66
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about Blacks exhibit a "rebound effect" that makes them more likely to rely
on those stereotypes.
The impact of race on the ability to ignore inadmissible evidence is
especially relevant to removal proceedings where most respondents are
racial or ethnic minorities, the majority being Latino.372 The studies above
suggest that it may be harder for immigration judges to ignore restraints
when the respondent is a person of color. In addition, judges may be less
aware of the influence that restraints have on them when their decisions are
consistent with previously held stereotypes about immigrants from certain
racial or ethnic groups, and any attempts to suppress those stereotypes may
simply amplify them.
6. Conclusions Regarding the Impact of Restraints on Judges
The impact of restraints on judges, like their impact on litigants, is
relevant to the first and third factors of the Mathews test, as well as to the
analysis of prejudice. The litigant has a liberty interest in an unbiased
adjudicator, and if the use of restraints leads to implicit bias, it contributes
to the risk of error. In addition, judicial bias is relevant to the analysis of
prejudice, as it may affect the outcome of the case. Thus, empirical studies
of implicit bias, which traditionally have not been utilized in the procedural
due process analysis, are actually highly relevant in the context of restraints.
Future research that specifically examines whether-or to what extentjudges are susceptible to prejudice by the sight of restraints would be
extremely helpful. This research could explore not only judges'
unconscious responses to restrained litigants, but also the influence of race,
gender, and legal status on judges' decisions to require restraints. 7 In

371

Id. (citing Gordon Hodson & John F. Dovidio, Racial Prejudice as a Moderator of
Stereotype Rebound: A Conceptual Replication, 25 REPRESENTATIVE RES. IN Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 6
(2001); C. Neil Macrae et al., Out of Mind but Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 815 (1994); and Margo Monteith et al., Consequences of
Stereotype Suppression: Stereotypes on AND Not on the Rebound, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 355, 375 (1998)).
372
US Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Courts by Nationality, Geographic
Location, Year and Type of Charge, TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/
immigration/charges/deport filingcharge.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (showing that in FY
2013, 199,586 individuals were in removal proceedings, of whom 75,309 were Mexican, 24,400
were Guatemalan, 24,380 were Salvadoran, and 22,410 were Honduran).
373 Racial disparities are known to exist in the use of physical restraints in other contexts, such
as nursing homes. See Kimberly M. Cassie & William Cassie, Racial Disparities in the Use of
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addition, it would be helpful to examine whether the practice of shackling
immigration detainees reinforces stereotypes of immigrants as
threatening.374 If so, then challenging the indiscriminate use of restraints
could help subvert the very stereotypes that contribute to the formation of
implicit biases.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Require IndividualizedJudicialDeterminationsofNecessity for
Bond and Merits Hearings
In light of the due process analysis discussed above, restraints should
only be applied in bond and merits hearings if the immigration judge makes
an individualized determination that the restraints are necessary because the
detainee poses a safety threat or flight risk. Furthermore, instead of
defaulting to "full restraints," which includes handcuffs, leg irons, and belly
chains, judges should impose no more restraints than are necessary in a
particular case, consistent with other civil cases. When there is a genuine
dispute of material fact about the threat to security, the court should hold an
evidentiary hearing, which will help ensure that the judge considers all of
the evidence instead of blindly accepting a recommendation made by ICE.
This type of hearing will also help minimize the influence of implicit bias
by requiring the judge to make findings of fact on the record. In order to
reduce the burden on the court, ICE could adopt a general presumption that
restraints are not necessary and argue for restraints only in exceptional

Physical Restraints in U.S. Nursing Homes, 39 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 207, 209-10 (2014)

(finding that black nursing home residents are more likely to be restrained than white residents,
after controlling for characteristics such as dementia, behavior problems, falls and activities of
daily living, which places black residents at greater risk of death, physical harm, and
psychological harm due to restraint usage); Ocen, supra note 208, at 1243-44 (discussing the
structural role of race and gender in the shackling of black women prisoners); Elizabeth L.
MacDowell, Theorizingfrom Particularity:Perpetratorsand Intersectional Theory on Domestic

Violence, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 531, 547-48 (2013) (discussing the intersection of race and
gender in stereotypes of Latinos and Latinas).
3 74

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & MAGALY SANCHEZ R., BROKERED BOUNDARIES: CREATING

IMMIGRANT IDENTITY IN ANTI-IMMIGRANT TIMES 68 (2010) (arguing that the media and political

discussions portray Latinos as a threat to the country); Anita Ortiz Maddali, The Immigrant
"Other": Racialized Identity and the Devaluation of Immigrant Family Relations, 89 IND. L.J.

643, 650, 677-78 (2014); Chac6n, supra note 106, at 1838; David B. Thronson, Of Borders and
Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts,

11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y 45, 54-55 (2005).
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cases where there is evidence that a particular detainee presents a safety or
flight risk.
B. Require a Lesser Showing ofNecessity for Master Calendar
Hearings
Bond hearings and merits hearings require a high level of participation
by immigration detainees, as they usually involve substantial testimony.
Since restraints affect cognition and behavior, they are most likely to be
harmful during these trial-like proceedings. A respondent who feels
disempowered may give weak testimony or crumble under crossexamination. Restraints are also most likely to prejudice the judge during
bond and merits hearings because these proceedings often require
determinations about dangerousness and credibility. Master calendar
hearings, which are brief status hearings, do not raise these same concerns.
However, important decisions are still made at master calendar hearings.
At the initial master hearing, the respondent normally admits or denies the
factual allegations and concedes or denies the charge of removability.
Sometimes, denying the charge and making the government prove its case
is the best course of action for a respondent who may not be eligible for any
form of relief. A respondent who does this may succeed simply because the
government does not have the proper documents to support the charge. A
restrained respondent who feels powerless may be especially likely to
concede removability instead of making the government prove its case.
Similarly, the decision of whether or not to apply for relief occurs at a
master calendar hearing, and restraints may impair a respondent's
motivation to submit an application. Furthermore, the sight of a respondent
in restraints at multiple master calendar hearings may prejudice the judge
even if the respondent subsequently appears free of restraints on the day of
the merits hearing.
For all of these reasons, courts should still require individualized
determinations of the need for restraints at master calendar hearings, but a
lesser showing of necessity may be appropriate. This approach would be
consistent with the California Supreme Court's decision requiring a lesser
showing for pretrial hearings.
In addition, ICE should provide a room for
detainees to meet with counsel before and after master hearings to mitigate
the impact of restraints on the ability to confer with counsel.

375See People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302, 1322 (Cal. 1991).
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C. Take Steps to Minimize JudicialBias

'

In the same way that judges must take steps to minimize prejudice
during a jury trial by hiding restraints as much as possible so that the jury
will not be aware of them, judges should take steps to minimize their own
implicit biases. Keeping restraints out of sight might help but is likely not
enough, since the judge would still know that the respondent is restrained.
More systemic changes are therefore necessary to reduce the influence of
implicit bias.376 To begin with, immigration judges should be educated
about implicit bias and the research on judicial susceptibility to such bias. 77
As part of this educational training, judges should be required to take an
Implicit Association Test (IAT) to become more aware of how implicit bias
affects them personally. Taking this test may motivate them to combat
implicit bias, which has been shown to reduce the impact of implicit bias on
behavior.
Developing an IAT that specifically examines implicit biases
associated with restraints would be extremely helpful in furthering our
understanding of their prejudicial impact.
Second, the Department of Justice should audit discretionary decisions
by individual judges, such as bond determinations and asylum decisions, to
check for patterns of implicit bias.379 Auditing not only provides data that is
useful in examining implicit bias, but it also increases accountability in a
system where only a small percentage of decisions are reviewed by the
BIA. 380 Auditing would also help identify specific judges who would
benefit the most from de-biasing interventions, since studies indicate huge
variations in the behavior of immigration judges.38

376

See generally Cheryl Staats, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, Ohio
State University, State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 53-63 (2013) (discussing debiasing
techniques), availableat http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-ImplicitBias.pdf.
377
See Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 314, at 1228; John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real,
Unconscious Influences on JudicialDecision-Making: The Illusion ofObjectivity, 42 McGEORGE
L. REv. 1, 7-8 (2010).
378 Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness:Implicit Bias and the Law, 58
UCLA L. REv. 465, 486-87, 500 (2010).
379See Unconscious Racial Bias, supranote 314, at 1230.
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381

See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60
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rates for asylum).
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Third, changes should be made in courtroom practice.
Currently,
some immigration courts are located inside detention facilities and only
hear detained cases. 38 3 Others have separate detained and non-detained
dockets, which are typically assigned to different judges, so that some
judges only hear detained cases.384 The practice of having certain judges
hear all of the detained cases will amplify negative stereotypes about
immigrants for those judges. Mixing detained and non-detained cases, on
the other hand, will increase exposure to positive counter-stereotypes,
which helps minimize implicit bias. 385
Finally, the conditions of decision-making could be vastly improved to
give immigration judges greater opportunity for deliberative thought.
Funding for the immigration courts should be increased to hire more judges.
This will help reduce caseloads and give judges more time on each case,
which will allow them to issue more thoughtful, written decisions and
alleviate stress and burnout. These changes should help reduce the impact
of implicit bias on decision making.
D. Increase Fundingfor Immigration Courts to Improve Security
Immigration courts currently have minimal security.386 There is no
bailiff and no law enforcement presence besides the few ICE officers who
bring the detainees to court.387 Typically, everyone entering the courthouse
must walk through a metal detector, and some courts also have X-ray
Unconscious RacialBias, supra note 314, at 1231.
e.g., Immigration Court Eloy, Arizona, U.S. Dep't of Just. (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/elo/elomain.htm (last visited February 17, 2015).
3
8See Improving Docket Efficiency through Better Communication and Coordination:Roles
of USCIS, ICE, and FOIR, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. http://www.dhs.gov/improving-docket(last
efficiency-through-better-communication-and-coordination-roles-uscis-ice-and-eoir
published June 29, 2012).
385
See Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 314, at 1226-27; Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten
Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 411-13
(2007); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI.
427, 438 (2007); Dale Larson, Unconsciously Regarded as Disabled: Implicit Bias and the
Regarded-As Prong of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 UCLA L. REV. 451, 474-75
(2008); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action ", 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1105 (2006).
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machines that scan bags and briefcases for weapons."' Improving these
security measures would help alleviate security concerns without infringing
on any due process rights. Experts on courthouse security advise that, in
addition to weapons screening, law enforcement officers should be present
on the interior and exterior of the courthouse to prevent violence. 38 9 Having
a plan in place to handle violent incidents and holding practice "drills" are
also important. 390 Risk-assessments can help understand the specific
security risks and vulnerabilities of each courthouse.39 1
Funding these types of security measures is not only important to ensure
the safety of court personnel, litigants, and witnesses, but also to protect the
rights of detainees. While funding for immigration enforcement efforts has
soared over the past decade, resulting in the deportation of nearly 450,000
people per year, funding for immigration courts has remained stagnant.39 2 In
2014, the resources dedicated to immigration enforcement reached almost
$18 billion, which is higher than for all other federal law enforcement
combined, but the funding for immigration courts and the BIA was just 1.7
percent of that amount at $312 million. 9 Similarly, while the number of
enforcement personnel doubled during the past decade, the number of
immigration judges increased by just ten percent.394 Allocating more
resources to immigration courts so that they can keep up with enforcement
efforts (or, alternatively, scaling back on enforcement) would help address
the root causes of security concerns. When resources are invested to support
safety measures like bailiffs in the courtrooms, judges will be less likely to
reassure themselves by restraining the respondents who appear before them.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The prohibition against the indiscriminate use of restraints has been
recognized for hundreds of years as fundamental to the integrity of a jury
trial, yet courts have been slow to examine the applicability of this due
process right to other types of proceedings. A close examination of the
rationales underlying this prohibition indicate that its reach should be
broader than many courts have recognized, since dignity, the ability to
participate fully in a proceeding, and fairness in the fact-finding process are
essential to many types of hearings, including removal proceedings. The
analysis set forth above indicates that procedural due process demands an
individualized judicial determination of the need for restraints in removal
proceedings to protect these important legal principles. This analysis also
highlights the need for courts to reexamine the ways that restraints may
impair a litigant's mental faculties even if they do not inflict physical
suffering and to question outdated theories about the objectivity of judges
given recent empirical studies. Both lines of inquiry inform the procedural
due process analysis by casting new light on the private interests at stake
and the risk of erroneous deprivation. They also suggest that due process
errors involving the use of restraints should be deemed inherently
prejudicial since restraints have profound and pervasive effects that evade
measurement and remain difficult to prove in any particular case.

